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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past fifty years, trademark licensing' has become an increas-
ingly popular method of structuring business relationships in the United
1. I define "trademark licensing" as any contractual arrangement wherein the owner of a trade
name or trademark licenses its name or mark to another, usually, but not necessarily, for a fee. Under
the agreement, the licensee then has a contractual right to produce and sell goods bearing the licen-
sor's mark. Throughout the Article, I refer to trademark licensing simply as "licensing." Unless a




States. Today, trademark licensing can be found in every sector of the
American economy. Michael Jordan's trademarks appear on Nike gym
shoes. Coca-Cola's trademarks appear not only on soda pop produced by
independent bottling companies, but also on Coke pants and Coke teddy
bears. The logos of UCLA and other universities appear on millions of
baseball caps, T-shirts, and other articles of clothing. Johnny Carson's
name appears on sporting goods. The glassworks company, Coming In-
corporated, licenses its marks to Owens-Coming, a maker of fiberglass
products under the Owens-Coming label. McDonald's, Kentucky Fried
Chicken, and thousands of other franchisors sell millions of products
through trademark licensing arrangements.2 These are only some of the
businesses in which licensing plays a prominent role. Yet, despite the in-
creased prevalence of trademark licensing arrangements, courts and legis-
latures have not developed clear rules for determining whether trademark
licensors can be held strictly liable for personal injuries caused by their li-
censees' defective products. 3 This Article analyzes a particular strand of
the problem.
4
2. This Article focuses primarily on trademark licensing outside the franchise context. Unique
issues arise in franchising cases. Frequently, the franchisor is sued for negligent provision of services,
and strict liability does not apply. Product liability theories are discussed in some of these cases, but
traditional agency theories are more common. Additionally, the franchise relationship typically con-
tains contracts between the franchisor and franchisee that entangle the franchisor in the franchisee's
business in ways that may exceed the involvement of other trademark licensors in the affairs of their
licensees. Thus, many of these cases are not particularly germane to the issue of whether trademark
licensors should be subject to strict liability outside the franchising context. For a more thorough dis-
cussion of franchisor liability, see, e.g., John W. Behringer & Monica A. Otte, Liability and the
Trademark Licensor: Advice for the Franchisor of Goods or Services, 19 AM. Bus. L.J. 109 (1981);
William R. Borchard & David W. Ehrlich, Franchisor Tort Liability: Minimizing the Potential Liabil-
ity of a Franchisorfor a Franchisee's Torts, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 109 (1979); Robert W. Emerson,
Franchisor's Liability When Franchisees Are Apparent Agents: An Empirical and Policy Analysis of
"Commwn Knowledge" About Franchising, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 609 (1992); John C. Monica, Fran-
chisor Liability to Third Parties, 49 MO. L. REv. 309 (1984); Michael R. Flynn, Note, The Law of
Franchisor Vicarious Liability: A Critique, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 89; John F. Stuart, Comment,
A Franchisor's Liability for the Torts of His Franchisee, 5 U.S.F. L. REV. 118 (1970); Note, Liability
of a Franchisorfor Acts of the Franchisee, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 143 (1967).
3. It should be noted at the outset that under the generally prevailing approach, strict liability
is not really "strict" in all cases that are brought under section 402a of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. As the authors of the newly released Restatement (Third) of Torts point out, "liability without
fault" generally only applies to manufacturing defect claims. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (1997). By contrast, failure-to-warn and design defect claims are
analyzed under a reasonableness standard that incorporates foreseeability into the equation. The rea-
sonableness standard that is utilized in both design defect and failure-to-warn cases is the same as that
used in negligence law. See id. Accordingly, in failure-to-warn and design defect cases, the issue
presented is whether trademark licensors should be held vicariously liable for their licensees' negli-
gence.
4. In a separate article, I consider in greater depth whether licensors should be strictly liable
for their licensees' goods based on the theory that consumers buy those goods in reliance on the repu-
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In several cases, courts have applied an enterprise theory of liability
to impose strict liability on trademark licensors. 5 The enterprise theory
was originally developed outside the trademark licensing context as a
means to impose strict liability on entities that are not technically sellers,
such as lessors and jobbers, but who nevertheless participate in the deliv-
ery of goods to consumers. Broadly stated, the enterprise theory holds that
any entity that "significantly participates" in the enterprise that places a
defective product into the stream of commerce will be treated as a "seller,"
and thus subject to strict liability under section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.
Although courts have applied the enterprise theory to trademark li-
censors based on factual findings that a particular licensor had a sufficient
"participatory connection" to its licensee, or was "significantly enough in-
volved" in its licensee's operations, they have not clearly defined what
they mean by these terms. Nor have courts developed a coherent theory to
explain why certain licensor conduct should be deemed significant for
strict liability purposes. In short, their approach frequently boils down to
nothing more than an "I-know-it-when-I-see-it" test.
Courts have had trouble articulating clear rules in this area for four
primary reasons. 6 First, they are not explicit about what they are doing.
Though courts purport to rely on strict liability rationales, they invariably
cite evidence of the licensor's control, right to control, or general involve-
ment in its licensee's affairs-evidence for determining vicarious liability.
Second, constructing a clear test is inherently difficult in this area be-
cause trademark licensing arrangements do not fit neatly into established
vicarious liability categories, which generally are based on the level of
control and decisionmaking shared between parties. Unlike traditional
agency relationships or independent contractor arrangements where the
law of vicarious liability is clear, trademark licensing arrangements vary
with respect to shared control and decisionmaking. Thus, the relationship
between licensor and licensee may fall into an area where vicarious liabil-
ity law historically has been murky and makes it difficult to develop uni-
form rules.
7
tation of the licensor. See David J. Franklyn, The Apparent Manufacturer Doctrine, Trademark Li-
censors and the Third Restatement of Torts, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming May 1999).
5. See infra Part III.A.
6. See infra Part IV.B.
7. See infra Part II.C.
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Third, the "quality control requirement"--as established at common
law and codified in the federal Lanham Act4-has not been clearly de-
fined. The Lanham Act requires licensors to exercise sufficient control
over their licensees so as to ensure that all goods bearing the same mark
are of the same quality; a licensor who fails to meet the quality control re-
quirement "abandons" its mark and cannot prevent use of the mark by oth-
ers.9 However, neither the Lanham Act nor the cases construing it clearly
define the scope of the quality control requirement to indicate how much
control is necessary for a licensor to retain its interest in its mark. The
confluence of an unclear regime of tort law and an uncertain interpretation
of the Lanham Act require licensors to walk a "control tightrope."' 10 If
they exercise too little control, they risk a finding of abandonment, but if
they exercise too much control, they risk a finding that they are strictly li-
able for their licensees' defective goods."
Fourth, courts may be reticent in developing clear rules in this context
because such rules may encourage strategic behavior among licensors and
their licensees to escape liability. By manipulating their licensing ar-
rangements, licensors may retain practical control over their licensees but
be deemed not vicariously liable as a matter of law. Courts may fear that,
even where there may be strong equitable justifications for imposing strict
liability, they may lose the ability to do so under such conditions. This
concern, however, is not unique to trademark licensing; it exists in every
area of law.
In this Article, I argue that the control tightrope and the general inde-
terminacy of licensor liability law is neither necessary nor desirable. Once
the courts acknowledge that the relevant task is to design a set of flexible
vicarious liability rules-rules that account for licensor control and in-
volvement but which do not require proof of agency--constructing a co-
herent theory of licensor liability should be possible. The challenge is to
articulate a set of rules that will impose strict (vicarious) liability on licen-
8. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp. III1997), amended by Trademark Law
Treaty Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-330, 112 Stat. 3064 (1998).
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5)(A).
10. See Kenneth B. Germain, Tort Liability of Trademark Licensors in an Era of
"Accountability": A Tale of Three Cases, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 128, 140 (1979) (discussing the term
"control tightrope").
11. The "control tightrope" can be illustrated with a hypothetical case. Suppose, for example,
that Nike manufactures "Air Jordan" gym shoes under a licensing agreement with Michael Jordan. If
Michael Jordan's attorneys are aware of the competing demands of the Lanham Act and the enterprise
liability theory, they may advise him to institute a "minimalist" quality control program, which con-
sists of just enough control to appear to satisfy the Lanham Act but not enough to make him appear
"significantly involved" in Nike's operations.
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sors who are not mere passive investors but who exert substantial control
over their licensees, and who use the licensing arrangement to improperly
shield themselves from liability. Such rules should be clear enough to en-
able licensors to determine in advance the type of conduct that will expose
them to strict liability and require them to insure against that risk. Finally,
such rules should distinguish between Lanham Act control and the type of
control that is likely to trigger strict liability.
Toward these ends, I argue that a more cogent theory of licensor li-
ability can be constructed by borrowing the basic analytical framework as
well as certain key precepts from corporate veil piercing law. In the cor-
porate context, courts are faced with a similar dilemma of determining
whether investors, who are not liable under traditional agency principles,
have nevertheless exerted inordinate control over their corporations or oth-
erwise abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate form such
that they should be held liable for the acts of the businesses in which they
have invested. In the corporate context, the law grants shareholders an
initial presumption of limited liability on the theory that such a rule will
stimulate investment and contribute to the overall good of the economy.
Courts have evolved fairly clear, yet flexible rules for disregarding
this presumption. Under generally prevailing tests, the corporate veil will
be pierced if a stockholder (1) completely dominates and controls corpo-
rate affairs such that he is the corporation's "alter ego"; (2) controls the
area of corporate decisionmaking that gave rise to the lawsuit; or (3)
grossly undercapitalizes the corporation or strips corporate assets such that
the corporation cannot satisfy reasonably foreseeable financial obligations,
including tort judgments.
12
Licensor liability law might benefit from a similar analytic frame-
work-that is, an initial presumption of limited licensor liability coupled
with clear, flexible piercing tests. 13 Indeed, one may easily draw analogies
between these two areas of law. In each situation, an entity invests its
"capital" in an enterprise with the hope of financial gain. The stockholder
invests her money; the licensor invests the value of her name or mark. In
each situation, the investor's capital contributes to the overall success of
the venture and the investor agrees to share profits, but not losses, with the
enterprise. Further, the investor is legally required to exercise some type
of control over the enterprise in which she invests.14 Finally, licensors,
12. See infra Part V.A.
13. See infra Part V.B.
14. By statute, stockholders together must elect corporate officers and ensure that they perform
their basic functions. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
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like stockholders, may choose to be either active or passive participants in
the enterprise, depending on a variety of factors.
The same rationale in corporate law that a presumption of limited li-
ability for stockholders will stimulate investment and generally strengthen
the economy can be applied to investing in the trademark licensing con-
text. Indeed, the sheer volume of trademark licensing is evidence that it
stimulates the free flow of capital and promotes economic growth. Like
other investors, licensors are more likely to risk their "capital" if the courts
afford them a similar initial presumption of nonliability, 15 and if there are
clear ground rules for determining when such a presumption will be disre-
garded.
16
While the shareholder analogy is compelling, it is not a necessary
foundation for the general position I advance here. Even if one does not
fully accept the licensor-stockholder analogy, there are sound reasons to
afford licensors an initial presumption of limited liability.17 Among other
things, such a presumption would help organize the law in this area, and
should enable licensors and licensees to allocate the costs of strict liability
insurance more efficiently.
Moreover, an initial presumption of limited liability need not neces-
sarily be as strong in the licensing context as it is in the shareholder con-
text." For a variety of reasons, it may be appropriate to pierce the licens-
ing veil more frequently, or more easily, than the corporate veil. But there
should be an explicit initial presumption and clear tests for disregarding
that presumption.
Under the proposal advanced here, a licensor's presumption of nonli-
ability would be disregarded if particular tests were satisfied. I propose
that the presumption be disregarded when a particular licensor: (1) was the
"functional equivalent" of a manufacturer of the defective goods; (2) con-
trolled the particular activity that gave rise to the product defect at issue;
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 43.10 (rev. perm. ed. 1990). The Lanham Act requires licensors to ex-
ercise some form of control over the quality of the licensed goods. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5)(A).
15. The presumption of nonliability for licensors could be thought of as a presumption of
"limited liability," as it is called in the shareholder context, because under the proposed approach,
licensors' investment in their licensees would continue to be at risk even if they were not personally
liable for the acts of their licensees.
16. The law must make a starting presumption in one direction or the other-that is, that licen-
sors generally are, or are not, subject to strict liability. Indeed, it would appear that a presumption of
nonliability is already inherent in the enterprise liability theory, since it imposes strict liability only on
licensors who are "significantly involved" in their licensees' affairs.
17. See infra Part V.B.
18. See infra Part V.B.
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(3) knew, or reasonably should have known, that the licensee was not ade-
quately insured against reasonably foreseeable product liability risks; (4)
induced consumers to believe that the defective goods were manufactured
by the licensor or that the licensor vouched for the safety of the defective
goods, and plaintiff purchased the goods in reliance on such a belief; or (5)
contracted with a foreign licensee/manufacturer not subject to personal ju-
risdiction in the state where the defective goods were sold.'9
While these tests are intended to be fairly comprehensive, they are not
necessarily the exclusive grounds for disregarding the presumption of li-
censor nonliability.2 ° Other circumstances may justify holding a licensor
liable for defective goods produced by its licensee. Nevertheless, these
tests should provide a useful starting point for further development and re-
finement of law in this area.
The remainder of this Article is divided into four parts. Part II pro-
vides an overview of basic trademark law and the historical evolution of
trademark licensing in the United States. Part III surveys the cases that
have applied the enterprise theory (or similar theories) of strict liability to
trademark licensors. Part IV identifies a number of problenis with the cur-
rent case law in this area. Part V attempts to construct a coherent model of
strict liability for trademark licensors along the same lines sketched above.
II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN TRADEMARK LICENSING
A. BASIC DEFNITIONS
A "trademark" is a "word, name, symbol or device" used to identify
goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others.
21
By contrast, a "trade name" is any name that identifies a business or an
enterprise. 22 Of course, a trade name can also be a trademark, and courts
often use these terms interchangeably.
Trademark ownership rights are acquired when a person combines
origination of a mark with its actual use in trade.23 A significant "stick" in
the bundle of trademark ownership rights is the ability to exclude others
19. See discussion infra Part V.C.
20. See discussion infra Part V.C.
21. Lanham Act, § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
22. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 4:13 (1996).
23. See id. § 3:3. This understanding of ownership led some courts at one time to hold that a
trademark owner could not license his mark until he had used it himself. This is no longer the prevail-
ing view. Today, trademark owners are allowed to license marks that were not previously used.
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from using the same or confusingly similar marks. 24 A corollary of the
right to exclude is the right to permit others to use the mark-usually
through a licensing arrangement. While trademark registration at both the
state and federal levels is common, it is neither required, nor a prerequisite
to establishing ownership of a mark. However, because federal registra-
tion offers the registrant a variety of benefits, most trademark owners reg-
ister under the federal scheme, as set forth in the Lanham Act.25
B. THE QUALITY ASSURANCE THEORY AND THE EMERGENCE
OF TRADEMARK LICENSING
At early common law, trademark owners were not permitted to li-
cense their marks to others because trademarks were viewed solely as indi-
cators of the physical source of goods.2 6 Licensing was considered illegal
because consumers would be "misled" as to the physical source of goods if
an entity's trademark appeared on goods that had been manufactured by
someone else.27 Beginning around the 1930s, a judicially led trend to
permit trademark licensing gradually developed. 8 But licensing was
permitted only so long as the trademark owner exercised control over the
quality of the trademarked goods that were produced by its licensees.
With the passage of the federal Lanham Act in 1946, the judicial trend be-
came the prevailing rule.
29
24. See id. § 2:14.
25. The federal registration scheme is set out in the Lanham Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051,
amended by Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-330, 112 Stat. 3064 (1998).
Under the Lanham Act, after a mark is registered, the owner is permitted to use the federal courts to
protect her right against an infringer of the mark. Many states have enacted statutory registration
provisions that largely parallel the Lanham Act, but the protection they afford is limited to the
boundaries of the state and rarely exceeds that which is available under the Lanham Act. See gener-
ally MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 22.
26. See Note, Antitrust Problems in Trademark Franchising, 17 STAN. L. REV. 926, 927
(1965); Note, Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark Licensing, 72 YALE L.J. 1171,
1174 (1963).
27. See Macmahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468, 475 (8th Cir. 1901)
("The essential value of a trade-mark is that it identifies to the trade the merchandise upon which it
appears as of a certain origin .... It is not by itself such property as may be transferred."). See also
Bulte v. Igleheart Bros., 137 F. 492 (7th Cir. 1905) (invalidating complainants' title to a trademark for
"White Swan" flour that was licensed unaccompanied by the transfer of the original trademark
owner's business); Comment, Trademark Licensing: The Problem of Adequate Control, 1968 DuKE
L.J. 875, 876-77 [hereinafter Comment, Problem of Adequate Control] (nothing that trademarks his-
torically were relied upon to indicate the source of a good and trademark licensing was "considerably
limited, since it was crucial for the consumer to be able to associate a trademarked product with its
actual source").
28. See K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1938).
29. See id.
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A system that allowed for trademark licensing held many benefits for
an expanding economy. Trademark licensing permitted businesses with
established trademarks to hire independent companies to manufacture their
goods at a cheaper price. As a result, trademark licensing could lead to a
greater diversity of goods and enhanced profits for the business class.
This trend was also facilitated by newly emerging theories about the
functions of trademarks. In 1927, New York attorney Frank I. Schechter
articulated the idea that trademarks served dual functions. 30 In addition to
serving as indicators of source, Schechter argued, trademarks also held a
"persuasive" function. As he wrote, "the trademark is not merely the sym-
bol of good will but often the most effective agent for the creation of good
will, imprinting upon the public mind an anonymous and impersonal guar-
anty of satisfaction, creating a desire for further satisfactions." 31 Schechter
urged the adoption of a more expansive theory of trademarks that took into
account "the fact that the creation and retention of custom, rather than the
designation of source, is the primary purpose of the trademark to-
day .... "32
Courts and commentators quickly followed Schechter in espousing
the notion that trademarks do not necessarily function as indicators of the
physical or manufacturing source of goods, but can also function as
"guarantees of satisfaction." The new theory of trademarks was quickly
dubbed the "guarantee theory." 33 This label probably was misleading,
since Schechter never asserted that a trademark was equivalent to a legal
guarantee of quality.34 Nevertheless, the "guarantee theory" was widely
accepted and was later refined into the "quality assurance theory." 35 By
the 1930s, courts had widely embraced the quality assurance theory and
generally accepted the view that trademarks did not necessarily indicate
physical source, but rather could indicate a "consistent" level of quality.
The quality assurance theory provided a theoretical justification for
trademark licensing. Under the new view of trademarks, the public would
not be misled as to product quality, so long as the licensor sufficiently
30. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813
(1927).
31. Id. at 819.
32. Id. at 822 (emphasis in original).
33. See Elmer William Hanak, III, The Quality Assurance Function of Trademarks, 43
FORDHAM L. REV. 363 (1974).
34. See Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade




monitored its licensees to ensure that the licensed goods were of the same
quality as other goods bearing the same mark. However, if the licensor
failed to exercise appropriate quality control, licensing would be deemed
improper because the trademarked goods might fail to conform to consum-
ers' expectations. Public reliance on the mark as a symbol of a certain
level of quality would thus be frustrated.36 Under the quality theory,
courts considered uncontrolled licensing, sometimes referred to as "naked"
licensing, improper.37 Those who engaged in such licensing risked a judi-
cial finding that they had "abandoned" their mark and had forfeited their
right to prevent use of the same or similar marks by others.
38
The trend to allow controlled licensing became the established rule in
1946 with the enactment of the federal Lanham Act.39 While the Lanham
Act does not specifically provide for trademark licensing, it permits use of
a trademark by a "related company."40 A "related company" is defined as
''any person whose use of the mark is controlled by the owner of the mark
with respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services on or in con-
nection with which the mark is used."41 It is now firmly established that
the Lanham Act definition of a "related company" is the same as that used
at common law to determine whether adequate quality control is exercised
over a trademark licensee.42  It is equally clear that under the Lanham
Act's definition of "abandonment," trademark licensing in the absence of
quality control results in relinquishment of the trademark owner's right to
exclude others from using the mark.
43
36. James M. Treece, Trademark Licensing and Vertical Restraints in Franchising Arrange-
ments, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 435,445 (1968).
37. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Celanese Corp. of Am., 167 F.2d. 484,489 (C.C.P.A.
1948).
38. See id.
39. See, e.g., Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d. 358, 366-69 (2d Cir. 1959)
(invoking the control requirement to determine if a wholesale distributor of donuts "sufficiently po-
liced and inspected its [retail] licensees' operations to guarantee the quality of the products they sold
under its trademarks to the public" to decide if it had abandoned its trademark); Huntington Nat'l
Mattress Co. v. Celanese Corp. of Am., 201 F. Supp. 938, 945 (D. Md. 1962) (holding that a licensor
has a duty to "take reasonable means to detect and prevent misleading uses of its mark by the affili-
ated companies" and that this affirmative duty on the part of the trademark owner is essential to pro-
tect the public's expectations based on past experiences with like-branded products).
40. See 15U.S.C. § 1127(1994&Supp. II1997).
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., National Trailways Bus Sys. v. Trailway Van Lines, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 352
(E.D.N.Y. 1965) (finding no related company in the absence of control over user's nature and quality
of services).
43. See Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d. at 367.
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C. THE EVOLUTION OF TRADEMARK LICENSING BEYOND
THE CLASSICAL MODEL
The quality assurance theory and the corollary rule requiring trade-
mark licensors to control the quality of the goods or services produced by
their licensees have dominated trademark licensing in the United States for
the past fifty years. However, during this same period, trademark licens-
ing has evolved beyond the model that gave rise to the "controlled licens-
ing" concept. At least four different types of trademark licensing ar-
rangements have emerged.
First, so-called "classical licensing," which began at least as early as
1930 and continues today, occurs whenever a manufacturer of goods with
a recognized brand name essentially "outsources" the actual physical
manufacturing processes to an independent company." Because the clas-
sical licensor knows the manufacturing process, it usually demands strict
compliance with its own standards and specifications, and closely super-
vises its licensees' operations. The fact that the licensee can make the
goods cheaper than the licensor serves as the primary motivation for this
arrangement.
45
Second, in the years immediately following World War II, franchising
arrangements became increasingly popular. Thousands of franchisors li-
censed their trademarks to franchisees who, in turn, sold the licensed
goods in outlets across the country.46 Indeed, a trademark license is in-
cluded in virtually every franchise contract.47 While there clearly exist
important parallels between trademark licensing in the franchise context
and trademark licensing in the manufacturing context, this Article focuses
primarily on the latter, since strict liability is more likely to be at issue
when the licensee is a manufacturer.
48
Third, more recently, a business practice known as "collateral mar-
ket" or "collateral product" licensing, which I will refer to as "collateral
44. See Alfred M. Marks, Trademark Licensing-Towards a More Flexible Standard, 78
TRADEMARK REP. 641,646-47 (1988).
45. In 1980, for example, Questor Corporation "produced nearly all of its SPALDING products
itself, and lost $12.6 million on sales of $273 million." Id. at 647. To remedy the situation, Questor
decided to outsource its manufacturing operations to trademark licensees, and three years later "earned
$12 million on $250 million of sales." Id.
46. See W.J. Keating, Promotional Trademark Licensing: A Concept Whose Time Has Come,
89 DICK. L. REV. 363, 364 (1985).
47. In 1982, trademark licensing accounted "for $339 billion or 31 percent of merchandising in
the United States." Id.
48. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (citing articles addressing trademark licensor li-
ability in the franchise context).
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licensing."49 One legal commentator has defined collateral licensing as
"the use of a mark on goods (or services) which are different, or which are
used in media different, from those in connection with which the public
recognition and demand [for the mark] were first created." 50 An example
of collateral licensing would be a situation in which General Motors li-
censed its marks to an independent refrigerator manufacturer, which then
made and sold refrigerators under the GM label. In the last twenty years,
collateral licensing has grown rapidly in every sector of the economy and
currently accounts for a substantial portion of total retail dollars earned
through trademark licensing.
51
A fourth type of licensing, which may be categorized as a subset of
collateral licensing, is known as "promotional trademark licensing." This
practice has been defined as the use of a mark in circumstances where its
primary function is to engender consumer identification with the mark, as
opposed to consumer reliance on the mark as an assurance of consistent
quality. 52 Today, we can buy Coke pants, Coke toys, Coke stuffed ani-
mals, and Coke school supplies-not to mention IBM beach towels and
Michael Jordan gym shoes. These are all examples of the phenomenal
growth of promotional licensing.
53
There are several important differences between classical and promo-
tional licensing. In the classical forms of licensing, the consumer, at least
theoretically, is "motivated to purchase a product bearing a trademark be-
cause of the consumer's expectation that the product will meet the quality
standards that the trademark owner achieves." 54 Conversely, in promo-
tional trademark licensing, the consumer is not motivated by the quality
level of the product, but "rather wishes to identify with the trademark
49. See Marks, supra note 44, at 646. This practice has been growing in recent years but it is
not new. See also Kevin Parks, "Naked" Is Not a Four-letter Word: Debunking the Myth of the
"Quality Control Requirement" in Trademark Licensing, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 531, 539 (1992)
(citing Finchley, Inc. v. George Hess Co., 24 F. Supp. 94 (E.D.N.Y. 1938), as an example of an "old"
case involving collateral market licensing).
50. Marks, supra note 44, at 646.
51. See id.
52. See Keating, supra note 46, at 372.
53. Promotional trademark licensing mushroomed in the 1970s, led by "such famous merchan-
dising forerunners as BUSTER BROWN, RAGGEDY ANN, SHIRLEY TEMPLE, BATMAN and
ROBIN and MICKEY MOUSE, and was followed by 007, STAR WARS, SNOOPY and
STRAWBERRY SHORTCAKE, among others." Marks, supra note 44, at 646. Colleges and uni-
versities, the NFL and the Olympic Committee followed suit, licensing the use of their names and
emblems to various manufacturers. See id. at 647.
54. Keating, supra note 46, at 372.
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owner."55 In promotional licensing, "the trademark proclaims the exhibi-
tor's loyalty, admiration or sympathy ... (the 'LAS' factor). '56 Available
empirical data suggest that in the promotional licensing context, consum-
ers do not believe that the licensor made or established quality standards
for a particular product, but rather that the licensor authorized the use of its
name or mark in connection with the product and financially benefits from
it in some way.57 In promotional licensing, the trademark functions pri-
marily as an advertising tool, not as an indicator of the physical source of
the goods or that the goods are of the same quality as all other goods
bearing the same mark.
Public perception is not the only area in which classical and promo-
tional trademark licensing differ. They also differ with respect to the li-
censor's practical ability to establish quality standards and specifications
for the licensed goods. In classical licensing, the licensor frequently is
well situated to establish product specifications and to ensure that they are
followed. 58 For example, "[tihe Coca-Cola Company has codified licens-
ing and franchising specifications for its independent bottlers, and staffs of
inspectors make certain that the licensing requirements are followed. 59
Conversely, when Coca-Cola authorizes the Murjani clothing company to
use Coke's marks on hats, pants or shirts, it probably cannot supply Mur-
jani with specifications or standards for these goods because no one at
Coke knows "what standards to specify when licensing in an unfamiliar
industry.
60
In light of these practical realities, some courts have exempted pro-
motional licensors from the quality control requirement altogether.
61
However, this clearly is not the general rule. Rather, the majority ap-
proach continues to be that promotional licensors, like all other licensors,
risk a finding of abandonment if they fail to "control the quality" of the li-
censed goods. I now turn to an examination of that requirement.
55. Id. (citing University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 686 F.2d 1040, 1047 (3d Cir.
1982) ("The entire impetus for the sale is the consumer's desire to identify with Pitt[sburgh] .....
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. See Marks, supra note 44, at 648-50.
59. Id. at 648.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 686 F.2d 1040 (3d Cir. 1982
(holding that the university's delay in bringing action for trademark infringement did not bar its right
to injunctive relief); Boston Prof'l Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d




D. THE QUALITY CONTROL REQUIREMENT
As several commentators have observed, "[n]either 'quality' nor
'control' is defined in the Lanham Act; they are common law creatures
whose evolution is incomplete and inconsistent. 62 A separate examina-
tion of these terms will be helpful.
1. "Quality"
"Quality" in this context does not necessarily mean "high quality."
63
Rather, it is generally agreed that quality here means "even quality" or a
consistent level of quality.64 The rule is based on the theory that consum-
ers come to associate trademarks with a certain level of quality, and they
will be misled if items bearing that trademark no longer meet that same
level of quality. For example, if a consumer normally associates the
"K mart" trademark with a relatively low level of quality, the consumer
will expect that same low level of quality whenever he buys goods bearing
that trademark. If the merchandise is better than expected, the consumer is
"deceived"--pleasantly deceived, but deceived nonetheless. If the mer-
chandise is worse than expected, the consumer is also deceived-but this
time, not pleasantly. Justice Stewart expressed the concept succinctly:
"An important ingredient of the premium brand inheres in the consumer's
belief, measured by past satisfaction and the market reputation established
by [a company] for its products, that tomorrow's can will contain the same
premium product as that purchased today."
65
To protect consumer expectations, courts have held that trademark
owners have a duty to police their licensees to ensure a "consistent level of
quality." But courts have had difficulty defining precisely what the term
"consistent level of quality" means in practice. One commentator has sug-
gested that, "the standard of quality which the licensee must meet is that of
the licensor's own goods, whether high, low or mediocre. If the licensor
does not manufacture the [licensed] goods, the standard may be similar
62. Parks, supra note 49, at 538.
63. See MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 3:10.
64. See id.
65. FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 651 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Societe
Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 636 (lst Cir. 1992) ("Every product is
composed of a bundle of special characteristics. The consumer who purchases what he believes is the
same product expects to receive those characteristics on every occasion.").
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products of the licensor or other licensees, or similar articles produced by
designated competitors."
66
However, this standard is flawed in several respects. First, there is
the "diverse quality" problem.67 That is, goods produced under an estab-
lished mark may have been of an "uneven" or inconsistent quality even
when the trademark owner manufactured them. Manufacturers may sell a
"bad batch" of goods because some product defects are difficult to spot.
Additionally, the quality of any given line of goods may vary over time,
depending on the vigilance with which manufacturers monitor quality.
Thus, it may be meaningless to require a licensee to produce goods that are
of the "same quality" as the licensor's own goods, since the licensor's own
goods may not be of a consistent quality.68 The diverse quality problem
undermines the viability of quality control requirements, even in the clas-
sical licensing situation where the requirement originated and was thought
most applicable.
69
The quality control requirement is even more puzzling in the collat-
eral and promotional licensing contexts.70 In these situations, there usually
are no other goods to set the relevant quality benchmark. 71 Hence, it is not
reasonable to say that the quality level must be the same as other products
produced by the licensor. For example, when Coca-Cola licenses its
trademark to a teddy bear manufacturing company, Coke cannot possibly
determine whether Coke teddy bears are as good as its soft drinks.72 Nor
can Coke teddy bears be compared with teddy bears produced by other
manufacturers, 73 since it would be highly arbitrary to determine which
other manufacturers to consider.
66. William M. Borchard & Richard M. Osman, Trademark Sublicensing and Quality Control,
70 TRADEMARK REP. 99, 101 n.11 (1980) (citing MCCARTHY, supra note 22, §3:4; Sidney A. Dia-
mond, Requirements of a Trademark Licensing Program, 17 Bus. LAW. 295, 300 (1962)). See also
Ronald B. Coolley, Related Company: The Required Relationship in Trademark Licensing, 77
TRADEMARK REP. 299 (1987) (discussing trademark licensing legislation and the significance of the
related company doctrine); F. Vein Lahart, Control-The Sine Qua Non of a Valid Trademark Li-
cense, 50 TRADEMARK REP. 103 (1960) (discussing a licensor's control of a licensee's use of a trade-
mark); Comment, Problem of Adequate Control, supra note 27, at 875 (examining the manner in
which courts have dealt with the Lanham Act's control requirement).
67. See Parks, supra note 49, at 537.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 536-38.
70. See id. at 538-40.
71. See id. See also Marks, supra note 44, at 648-50 (proposing that existing trademark licens-
ing rules regarding quality control should be clarified to more accurately reflect the "commercial rela-
ity" that most licensors do not exert much control over licensees under collateral or promotional li-
censing arrangements).
72. See Marks, supra note 44, at 648-50.
73. See Parks, supra note 49, at 539.
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This difficulty has left collateral and promotional licensors in a bind.
Because they have never manufactured the product they now wish to pro-
duce through a licensee, they are not in a position to point to a relevant and
controlling quality standard for the new product line. 4 Nor are they in a
position to supply their licensees with specifications or designs for the new
product.75 For these reasons, collateral and promotional licensors fre-




Under the Lanham Act, a trademark is subject to cancellation "on the
ground that the registrant (A) does not control, or is not able legitimately
to exercise control over, the use of such mark .... 7 Theoretically, con-
trol may include (1) the provision of detailed specifications and standards
for goods to be produced; (2) the submission of plans, drawings, prelimi-
nary models, and actual samples; (3) unannounced spot inspections of the
licensor's plant and facilities; (4) detailed rules about the placement size,
proportions, and use of the trademark to be affixed; and (5) remedies for
failure to meet such standards.
78
However, it is impossible to discern from the cases a single test re-
garding which type, or how much, control must be contractually retained
or actually exercised.79 At one end of the spectrum, a few cases appear to
hold that licensors must exercise extensive control over the licensee, es-
tablish specifications for manufacturing and designing the goods, and po-
lice their licensees to ensure that those specifications are followed.80 At
the other end of the spectrum, cases hold that the mere contractual right to
exercise quality control is sufficient. 81 In between these extremes are
cases upholding varying degrees of control, including cases finding no
abandonment, despite the licensor's "reasonable reliance" on its licensees
74. See Marks, supra note 44, at 648-50.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5)(A) (1994), amended by Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-330, 112 Stat. 3064 (1998).
78. See Marks, supra note 44, at 644.
79. See id. at 644-45. See also Parks, supra note 49, at 539-40 (discussing the wide range of
outcomes reached by courts in resolving the fact-based inquiry of the issue of control).
80. See, e.g., First Interstate Bancorp. v. Stenquist, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1704 (N.D. Cal.
1990). See also Parks, supra note 49, at 540 This approach, however, appears to be a distinct minor-
ity view, and indeed, this requirement would be impossible for many licensors to fulfill.
81. See Parks, supra note 49, at 540.
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to establish specifications, set quality standards, and otherwise police
quality.
8 2
Despite the articulated rule that the failure to exercise quality control
results in abandonment, courts have been reluctant to enforce this require-
ment.83 This appears to be because the issue typically arises in the context
of a licensor's suit against an infringer, and in such circumstances, courts
are reluctant to reward a party with such "unclean hands." 84 Accordingly,
as against a clear infringer, courts typically stretch to find some way to up-
hold the licensor's ownership rights in the mark. As a result of these de-
cisions, courts have diluted the quality control requirement to the point
where its meaning is no longer clear, if it even has any meaning at all.85
3. "Minimalist" Quality Control Programs
For some trademark licensors, an extensive quality control program is
appealing for business reasons. For example, when Coca-Cola licenses in-
dependent bottlers to make, bottle and distribute Coca-Cola products, it
probably is both possible and desirable for Coca-Cola to strictly control
the entire manufacturing process. Indeed, Coca-Cola would not be able to
maintain the uniform quality of its soft drinks if its licensees did not use
the same ingredients and formula. Coca-Cola, no doubt, has an army of
inspectors to ensure compliance with its extensive quality control program.
In this type of "classical" licensing situation, the economic incentives and
the means exist for the licensor to exercise extensive quality control.
Despite the apparent attraction of such programs, there is evidence
that even in the classical licensing context, many licensors simply do not
have quality control programs. 86 As Kevin Parks has observed, "[a]s long
as thirty years ago Senate hearings revealed widespread evasion of the
control requirement, even in traditional licensing contexts." 87 Such eva-
sion appears to be even more prevalent in the collateral and promotional
82. See, e.g., Printer's Servs. Co. v. Bondurant, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1626 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
83. See Parks, supra note 49, at 541-44. But see Midwest Fur Producers Ass'n. v. Mutation
Mink Breeders Ass'n., 127 F. Supp. 217 (W.D. Wis. 1954) (finding abandonment of mark and inva-
lidity of license agreements because of nonexercise of quality control); Heaton Enter. of Nev., Inc. v.
Lang, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1842 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (same).
84. See Parks, supra note 49, at 541.
85. See id. at 545. See also Comment, Problem of Adequate Control, supra note 27, at 902.
86. See Parks, supra note 49, at 544.
87. Id. at 544; Comment, Problem of Adequate Control, supra note 27, at 899 & n.126
(discussing Hearings on S. 1396 Before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of
the Senate Judiciary Comm., 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961)).
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licensing contexts. 88 Here, the problem probably is due to the inability of
such licensors to establish product specifications or to police their licen-
sees' quality assurance operations in a meaningful way.
89
As a result of these difficulties and the uncertain scope of the quality
control requirement, licensors may institute "illusory" or "minimalist"
quality control programs. Such programs might include boilerplate clauses
in licensing contracts, giving the licensor the right to monitor the quality of
the licensed goods, to inspect their licensees' premises, or to inspect prod-
uct samples at regular intervals.90 But beyond reserving such contractual
rights, it appears that many collateral and promotion licensors do little to
fulfill the quality control requirement.91 Instead, the licensee goes about
the business of designing, testing, and manufacturing the product with lit-
tle or no input from the licensor. As long as the product sells and the
royalty checks keep coming, both parties are happy.
92
But when the licensor is sued for defects in its licensees' goods, the
fact that the licensor's quality control has been illusory gains special sig-
nificance. In these circumstances, the licensor may find itself in a "no-
win" situation. If it acknowledges that its quality control program has
been "illusory"-or even "minimalist"--it might severely impair its ability
to prosecute a subsequent infringement suit if another entity appropriates
its trademark. If the licensor does not admit that its quality control pro-
gram is illusory or minimalist, it may have a difficult time obtaining sum-
mary judgment on plaintiff's enterprise liability claim because it may ap-
pear to be a "significantly involved" licensor. As the next section will
indicate, the latter risk is magnified by the fact that courts applying the
enterprise theory do not necessarily distinguish Lanham Act control from
the type of control that should be the basis for imposing strict liability.
88. See Parks, supra note 49, at 544-45.
89. See Marks, supra note 44, at 648-50. As Marks observes, in the increasingly prevalent
collateral licensing situation,
specifications cannot be supplied to the licensee because no one on the licensor's staff
knows what standards to specify when licensing in an unfamiliar industry. At best, the
agreement will call for merchandise based on some objective standard.... After the agree-
ment is executed, samples will be furnished by the licensee, advertising and labeling will be
prepared and approved. Proper trademark notices will be specified and utilized on the sam-
ples. Thereafter, active control over the licensee will be likely to cease. The business peo-
ple will be concerned with their next business deal and will not be likely to continue review-
ing the licensee's activities, so long as the royalty checks continue to arrive on time.
id. at 648-49.
90. See id. at 649.
91. See id. at 651.
92. See id. at 649.
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III. TRADEMARK LICENSORS AND CONTROL-BASED THEORIES
OF STRICT LIABILITY
A. ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
Beginning in the early 1960s, state courts in California created a new
common law doctrine holding that all entities that significantly participate
in the overall "enterprise" that introduces a product into the "stream of
commerce" are deemed "sellers," and thus are strictly liable for injuries
caused by that product under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.93 The doctrine has become known as the "stream of commerce" or
"enterprise liability" theory.94 Like strict liability generally, the enterprise
theory is based on two rationales: (1) that entities which both place prod-
ucts into the commercial arena and profit thereby are in a better position
than injured consumers to bear the risk of loss from such products; and (2)
that such entities are in a better position than injured consumers to prevent
the injury from occurring. In this way, enterprise liability, like strict li-
ability generally, is based on a "loss spreading" or "loss shifting" ration-
ale.
95
Several courts have used the "enterprise liability" theory, or a close
facsimile, to impose strict liability on licensors. Although the formulation
of this theory varies from case to case, courts have generally applied it
whenever the licensor was "substantially involved in" or an "integral part
of' an enterprise that placed a defective product into the stream of com-
merce. Such licensors are treated as "sellers" and held liable under section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which by its terms applies to
all commercial "sellers." The Ninth Circuit, applying Arizona law, stated
the rule as follows:
93. The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A provides as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual
relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
94. See Jerald E. Rosenblum & Kathy A. Fields, Product Liability Risks of University Research
Licensing and How They Affect Commercialization-Is It Time for a Legislative Solution?, 7 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 514,514-15 (1991).
95. See, e.g., Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 101 Cal. Rptr. 314, 329-30 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
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[T]rademark licensors who significantly participate in the overall proc-
ess by which the product reaches its consumer, and who have the right to
control the incidents of manufacture or distribution, are subject to liabil-
ity under the rules of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section
402A ... [Tihey are the functional equivalents of manufacturers and
sellers.
96
Courts have considered a variety of factors to determine whether a
trademark owner "significantly participates in" or is an "integral part of'
an enterprise. Relevant factors have included whether: (1) the licensor re-
tained the right to control the quality of the licensee's products; (2) the li-
censor actually exercised its quality control rights; (3) the licensor pro-
vided the licensee with design specifications for the product; (4) the
licensor monitored production to ensure that its specifications were fol-
lowed; (5) the licensor advertised the product; (6) the licensor received di-
rect or indirect financial benefit from the sale of the product; (7) the licen-
sor distributed the product; (8) the licensor was in a position to eliminate
the unsafe character of the product; (9) consumers relied on a trade name
or trademark which gave the impression that the trademark owner stood
behind or vouched for the product; and (10) the stated rationales for strict
liability support its application to a trademark licensor in a given case.
97
Courts have not indicated that any one of these factors alone is de-
terminative or that any one factor is entitled to greater weight than any
other. Nor have they required plaintiffs to show that all of these factors
were present in a given case. Rather, courts have held trademark licensors
strictly liable upon a showing that a "sufficient combination" of these fac-
tors made the licensor an "integral link" in the enterprise that placed a de-
fective product into the stream of commerce.
96. Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 901 F.2d 750, 751 (9th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Tor-
res III] (emphasis added) (quoting Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 786 P.2d 939 (Ariz. 1990)
(en banc) [hereinafter Torres I1]). See also Kasel, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 322 (holding that trademark licen-
sors are strictly liable under section 402A if they are "an integral part of the composite business enter-
prise which place[s] the defective [product] in[to] the stream of commerce").
The author devotes significant attention to an analysis of Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co,
a case which moved from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to the Arizona Supreme Court and back
to the Ninth Circuit. Thus, for clarity, these cases will be referred to throughout this Article as Torres
1, Torres II, and Torres Ilf. See Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 867 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1989)
[hereinafter Torres ].
97. See, e.g., Torres I11, 901 F.2d at 752-53; Kasel, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 325; City of Hartford v.
Associated Constr. Co., 384 A.2d 390,393 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1978).
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1. Kasel v. Remington Arms 98
The seminal case articulating a theory of enterprise liability to impose
strict liability on licensors is Kasel v. Remington Arms, decided by an in-
termediate California appellate court in 1972.99 There, a person injured by
a defective shotgun shell, manufactured by a foreign trademark licensee,
100
sued Remington Arms Company ("Remington"), the trademark licensor.
The court found that the licensor (1) caused the manufacturing entity CDM
to be created, (2) entered into three contracts with the licensed manufac-
turer,101 (3) owned forty percent of the outstanding stock of the manufac-
turer, (4) created common and interlocking officers and directors, and (5)
benefited financially from the arrangement. In light of these extensive re-
lationships, the appellate court held that the trial court should have found
as a matter of law that Remington was an integral part of the enterprise
that placed the defective shell in the stream of commerce.
102
In its subsequent discussion of the development of product liability
law in California, the court acknowledged that strict liability actions had
typically involved a manufacturer or downstream retailer, and that strict
liability had not previously been applied upstream to a franchisor-here, a
licensor permitting the licensee to use its trademark and business meth-
ods. 0 3 Nevertheless, given the relationship of the defendant licensor to
the manufacturer and the benefits accruing to the defendant from this rela-
tionship, the court concluded that strict liability was appropriate in this
case. The court reasoned that Remington had been an active participant in
the enterprise bringing the product to market, and as such had been more
98. 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
99. See id.
100. The Kasel court may have been influenced by the fact that the licensee in that case, CDM,
was a Mexican company that may not have been subject to the personal jurisdiction of a California
court, and Mexican law did not recognize strict liability. Thus, in order to provide the injured Cali-
fornia plaintiff with the same measure of recovery he would have received had the manufacturer been
a California corporation, the extended strict liability to an American trademark licensor that had in
fact extensively participated in its licensee's operations. See id. at 332-33.
101. The contracts included: (1) a trademark license giving the defendant the right to inspect and
control the product on which its trademark was used; (2) a contract for the sale of technical informa-
tion, whereby the defendant sold the manufacturer information about the scientific process relating to
the production of ammunition; and (3) a technical services contract under which the defendant agreed
to train and provide personnel for the manufacturer (licensee). Under the trademark license agree-
ment, Remington retained the right to inspect and control the quality of all ammunition on which its
trademarks were used. See id. at 318.
102. See id. at 322.
103. See id. at 323.
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involved than a typical downstream retailer who also could be held strictly
liable.1 4 The Kasel court stated the governing principle as follows:
It is the defendant's participatory connection, for his personal profit or
other benefit, with the injury-producing product and with the enterprise
that created consumer demand for and reliance upon the product (and
not the defendant's legal relationship (such as agency) with the manufac-
turer or other entities in the manufacturing-marketing system) which
calls for imposition of strict liability.
10 5
2. City of Hartford v. Associated Construction Co.
10 6
In 1978, a Connecticut court applied a similar theory in City of Hart-
ford v. Associated Construction Co.'07 The City of Hartford sued Silbrico,
trademark owner of "All-Weather Crete," to recover for property damage
resulting from a leaking roof on a public school and for expenses incurred
in repairing the roof. The City alleged that Silbrico was strictly liable un-
der section 402A for the following reasons: (1) Silbrico formulated, de-
signed, advertised, distributed, sold, and issued specifications and instruc-
tions for the product known as "All-Weather Crete," an insulating base for
built-up roofing systems; (2) Silbrico licensed the application and use of
its registered trademark throughout the country, and made the product
available through its licensees only; (3) Silbrico retained and exercised the
right to control the quality of the licensed goods; (4) Silbrico received
"substantial" financial benefit from the sale of the goods through royalty
payments; (5) Silbrico received other financial benefit through the sale of
perlite ore, which it sold as a necessary component of "All-Weather
Crete"; (6) the licensee, Skyway, prepared and applied the product to the
roof deck of the school following the standards and specifications of Sil-
brico; (7) the product as applied was in a condition that conformed to the
standards, formula, specifications and design provided by Silbrico; (8) the
product as applied was unsafe and in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the property of the user or consumer in that moisture was in-
troduced into it and, with changes in temperature, large cracks and crevices
developed, creating tears in the roofing membrane and causing the roof to
leak.
108
104. See id. at 323-24.
105. Id. at 323 (emphasis added).
106. 384 A.2d 390 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1978).
107. See id.
108. See id. at 392.
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Citing Kasel, the court found that the plaintiff had properly stated a
cause of action for strict liability against a trademark licensor.10 9  The
court noted that, while the case was factually different than Kasel, the
same public policy rationales applied in Kasel justified the imposition of
strict liability on the trademark licensor here."' The court reasoned that if
Silbrico itself were manufacturing the product, a strict tort analysis would
likely be applicable. Hence, "[ilt seems not to be in the public interest,"
the court opined, "to allow one to escape this responsibility through the
simple maneuver of entering a licensing agreement.""'
3. Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc.
112
In 1979, the Supreme Court of Illinois decided Connelly v. Uniroyal,
Inc.113 There, the plaintiff sued Uniroyal, the licensor, for a defective tire
manufactured in Belgium by its foreign and wholly owned subsidiary.
Although Uniroyal was heavily involved in its licensee's operations, 114 the
court stated that it was not holding Uniroyal liable under vicarious liability
principles. 15 Instead, the court held that because the tire bore the trade-
109. See City of Hartford, 384 A.2d at 394. Alternatively, the court held that the licensor could
be subject to strict liability as an apparent manufacturer under section 400 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. See id. at 396.
110. See id. at 394-96.
111. Id. at 397 (emphasis added).
112. 389 N.E.2d 155 (I1. 1979).
113. See id.
114. Specifically, the parties' trademark and trade name agreement provided that Uniroyal would
do the following: (1) provide its licensee with detailed information as to the methods, processes, and
formulas used in the manufacture of tires; (2) supply technical services and instructions to its subsidi-
ary, including recommendations and assistance in purchasing equipment, processes to improve opera-
tions, specifications, and testing procedure; (3) permit Uniroyal's licensee to visit Uniroyal's plant to
investigate its manufacturing methods; (4) receive quarterly royalty payments; (5) permit Uniroyal's
licensee to advertise that its manufacturing practices and technical methods were the same as Uni-
royal's; (6) maintain knowledge at all times of the manufacturing operations associated with the Uni-
royal trademark; and (7) enjoy preference when the licensee purchased any materials that were made
by Uniroyal. See id. at 161. It is unclear from the reported decision whether Uniroyal ever exercised
any of these contractual rights, beyond the fact that the licensee obviously exercised its right to manu-
facture tires bearing the Uniroyal trademark. The court specifically held that these facts, coupled with
the fact that Uniroyal owned 96% of its licensee's stock, were not sufficient to justify the imposition
of "vicarious liability" on Uniroyal under traditional agency or veil piercing principles. Uniroyal had
no "control" or "direction" over production at its licensee's manufacturing plant. Separate books and
records were kept. There were no shared bank accounts, employees, manufacturing facilities, or joint
liability insurance agreements. Finally, there was no evidence of joint board meetings between the
two companies' separate boards of directors. See id. at 161-62. However, Uniroyal's extensive in-
volvement in the manufacturing, testing, designing, advertising, and marketing of the licensed goods,
as evidenced by the parties' licensing agreement, provided significant background support for the
court's willingness to extend the doctrine of strict liability to a trademark licensor such as Uniroyal.
115. See id. at 161-62.
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mark Uniroyal, and Uniroyal financially benefited from its sale, there were
material questions of fact that precluded summary judgment.1t 6 Because
Uniroyal received financial benefit from the product, the court held that
the same public policy concerns that support the imposition of strict liabil-
ity on wholesalers, retailers, and lessors also support its application to li-
censors. 117 Purporting to follow Kasel, the court stated that the trademark
relationship itself makes every licensor an integral link in an enterprise
that places a defective product into the stream of commerce.
118
4. Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
1 19
Under Arizona law, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals again applied
the enterprise theory to a trademark licensor in Torres v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. 120 In Torres I, the plaintiff sued for injuries resulting from an
accident caused by tread separation on a Goodyear tire designed and
manufactured by Goodyear's foreign subsidiaries/licensees.' 2 ' The plain-
tiff did not allege that Goodyear caused the product defect or made any
design or manufacturing decisions. Rather, the plaintiff alleged that
Goodyear should be held strictly liable under the "enterprise theory" ar-
ticulated in Kasel and its progeny. 122  The district court granted Good-
year's motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed.
116. In Connelly, plaintiff argued that liability should be premised on the "apparent manufac-
turer doctrine" as set forth in section 400 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The licensor argued
that section 400 did not apply because it was neither a "seller" nor a "distributor" of the defective tire,
as most cases applying that doctrine have required. The court rejected the latter argument and instead
held that section 400 could apply even to a nonselling, nondistributing trademark licensor, at least
where, as here, the identity of the actual manufacturer was not also indicated on the defective product.
Moreover, the court appeared to premise the licensor's liability on a broader footing than section 400.
The court suggested that a licensor alvays is an integral link in the enterprise that places a defective
product into the "stream of commerce." Thus, the Connelly court blended a broad interpretation of the
apparent manufacturer doctrine with an equally broad interpretation of the stream of commerce theory
to justify the possible imposition of strict liability on a trademark licensor. The decision could have
been grounded in either the apparent manufacturer or stream of commerce rationale, but the court ap-
parently chose to rely on both to provide a stronger footing for its holding. See id. at 162-63.
117. See id. at 163.
118. Seeid.
119. Torres 1, 867 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1989).
120. See id. (certifying to Arizona Supreme Court the question of whether "enterprise theory of
strict liability should be applied to trademark licensors"); Torres II, 786 P.2d 939 (Ariz. 1990) (en
bane) (answering the certified question in the affirmative); Torres III, 901 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1990)
(withdrawing Torres I and remanding the case to the district court for further consideration).
121. See Torres I, 867 F.2d. at 1235.
122. Plaintiff sought to hold Goodyear liable under four separate theories, including: (1) the
"apparent manufacturer" doctrine; (2) principles of apparent agency; (3) the Arizona law of manufac-
turers' warranties; and (4) the "enterprise liability" theory of strict liability. See id. The district court
granted summary judgment for Goodyear on all four theories. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court's dismissal of the first three theories, finding that Arizona law did not recognize the
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit could not decide whether Arizona courts
would extend the enterprise theory of strict liability to a trademark licensor
like Goodyear, or whether Goodyear should be characterized as a
"manufacturer," as that term had been defined by Arizona's product liabil-
ity statute.123  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit certified the following ques-
tion to the Arizona Supreme Court:
[W]hether a trademark licensor is subject to strict product liability under
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts by reason of being
either (a) a manufacturer or seller within the meaning of [the Arizona
products liability statute]; or (b) an integral part of an enterprise respon-
sible for placing allegedly defective products on the market. 
124
The Arizona Supreme Court answered both parts of the certified
question in the affirmative. 125 Although the court noted that strict liability
may be inappropriate for a "mere licensor" of a trademark that does not
significantly participate in the process by which the licensed goods reach
their consumers, the court declined to decide that issue since Goodyear
was much more than a "mere licensor."' 126  Addressing plaintiff's
"enterprise liability" claim, the court held that licensors
who significantly participate in the overall process by which the product
reaches its consumers, and who have the right to control the incidents of
manufacture of distribution, are subject to liability under the rules of
Restatement § 402A as adopted and applied in Arizona. [Such trade-
mark licensors] are the functional equivalent of manufacturers and sell-
ers.1
27
apparent manufacturer doctrine, and that plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as
to the agency and warranty claims. See id. at 1234-37.
123. Under the Arizona statute, all "manufacturers" are subject to strict liability. See ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-681 to 12-686 (West 1982).
124. Torres 1, 867 F.2d at 1239. According to the concurring justice, the certified question
should have reflected plaintiffs allegations that Goodyear had extensive control over the design and
manufacturer of the tire. The operative licensing agreements provided that: (1) Goodyear's licensees
would manufacture the tires in strict accordance with its formulas, specifications, and restrictions; (2)
the licensees would use only materials approved by the licensor; (3) Goodyear had the right to inspect
its licensees' plants and samples of the licensed goods; (4) Goodyear was to do all the basic product
research for the licensed product; (5) Goodyear would perform the necessary quality control opera-
tions to ensure the quality of the goods; (6) Goodyear warranted the quality of the tires and agreed to
honor the licensee's warranties; and (7) Goodyear would profit from the sale of the goods. In addi-
tion, Goodyear owned all or almost all of its subsidiaries' stock; the companies shared some common
employees and board members; and the licensor, as a shareholder, was able to decide how much capi-
tal would be allocated to its licensees. See id. at 1240.
125. See Torres 11, 786 P.2d at 939.
126. See id. at 945.
127. Id. at 946-47.
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The court asserted that in all cases where courts had applied strict li-
ability to a trademark licensor, the licensors had been substantially in-
volved in their licensees' affairs. 128 The reservation of the right to control,
coupled with evidence of significant involvement, provided a sufficient
basis for applying the "enterprise liability" theory to trademark licen-
sors. 129 Moreover, while it was not necessary for plaintiff to prove that the
right to control was actually exercised, the court found it "naive" to think
Goodyear had not in fact controlled its wholly owned subsidiaries.
130
The court also held that the "broad definition" of "manufacturer" set
out in the applicable Arizona product liability statute could include certain
trademark licensors.1 31 That statute defined a manufacturer to include one
"who otherwise prepares the product prior to its sale."' 132 The court held
that "[s]urely the entity that dictates and controls the design, specifications
for formulation, technique for production, quality of production, market-
ing, advertising, sale, and warranty of a product can qualify as one who
'otherwise prepares' the product 'prior to its sale." ' 133 The court again
stated its strong suspicion that Goodyear had in fact exercised such con-
trol.
On remand to the Ninth Circuit, the court simply stated that "[t]here is
no question that Goodyear's involvement in the overall process by which
the tires in question reached the Torres' fits the [Arizona Supreme Court's
standard for applying enterprise liability to a trademark licensor].' 134 As
to the statutory claim, the Ninth Circuit held that "[b]ecause Goodyear's
involvement was extensive, albeit indirect.., it fell within the Arizona
Supreme Court's interpretation of [manufacturers, as set forth in the Ari-
zona product liability statute]."'135 Hence, in addition to being potentially
128. See id. at 946.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 943 n.2.
131. See id. at 947.
132. Id.
133. Id. (citation omitted).
134. Torres 111, 901 F.2d 750, 751 (9th Cir. 1990). After a jury verdict finding Goodyear USA
strictly liable, but exonerating Goodyear's foreign subsidiaries, which had actually designed and
manufactured the allegedly defective tire, Goodyear again appealed, arguing that the jury verdict was
intemally inconsistent because it could not be held derivatively liable under the enterprise theory if its
subsidiaries were not liable. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, in part on the ground that, based on the evi-
dence adduced at trial, the jury could have found that Goodyear USA's strict liability was "direct," not
"derivative." See Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., No. 94-15092, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
20375, at *9 (9th Cir. July 13, 1995) (unpublished table decision).
135. Torres III, 901 F.2d at 751. But see Yoder v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir.
1997) (upholding the trial court's determination that Honeywell, which had licensed the "Honeywell"
trademark to its subsidiary for use on computer keyboards, was not liable as a "manufacturer" or
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strictly liable under the enterprise theory, Goodyear could be strictly liable
as a "manufacturer" under Arizona law.
5. Burkert v. Petrol Plus of Naugatuck, Inc. 
136
In 1990, the same year that the Arizona Supreme Court decided Tor-
res II, the Connecticut Supreme Court handed down Burkert v. Petrol Plus
of Naugatuck, Inc.137  There, consumers sued a retailer of automatic
transmission fluid when the fluid turned out to be defective. After settling
those claims, Petrol Plus brought an action for indemnification against two
parties: Atlantic Coast Oil Company ("Atlantic") and General Motors Cor-
poration ("GM"). Petrol Plus had purchased the fluid from Atlantic. At-
lantic had purchased the fluid from another entity and labeled it as
"Kenmore Dexron II." "Kenmore" was a registered trademark of Atlantic,
and "Dexron II" was a registered trademark of GM. GM had licensed the
use of the Dexron II mark to Atlantic for use in connection with any fluid
that met GM's performance standards.
Under the licensing agreement, GM did not dictate specifications for
the product or in any way control its production. However, before a licen-
see could properly place the Dexron II mark on a can of fluid, it had to
submit the fluid to one of only two independent testing agencies that were
approved by GM. GM received no royalties or other direct financial
benefit from the use of the Dexron II trademark.
138
The court, citing Kasel and other stream of commerce cases, never-
theless found that because GM had an unusually limited role as a trade-
mark licensor, it did not meet the test set forth in Kasel. Specifically, the
court noted that GM had not sold or distributed the product, that GM did
not receive any financial benefit from the product, and that GM did not ex-
ercise control over the operations of its licensees. The court did not think
it dispositive that GM had required the licensees to meet performance
standards set by GM and to test the fluid only at GM-approved independ-
ent labs. 139 Burkert is thus a rare example of a case in which a minimally
involved licensor was held not liable under a stream of commerce the-
ory.
14 0
"apparent manufacturer" for injuries allegedly caused by the keyboards under Colorado's product li-
ability statute that similarly defined a "manufacturer" as one who prepares a product for sale).
136. 579 A.2d 26 (Conn. 1990).
137. See id.
138. See id. at 29.
139. See id. at 35-36.
140. Petrol Plus sought to hold GM liable under two other theories. First, it alleged that GM
should be held liable under negligence principles for failing to implement a quality control program to
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B. KOSTERS V. SEVEN UP CO. AND THE "IMPLIED WARRANTY THEORY"
A number of courts have used the "implied warranty" label to de-
scribe a theory closely resembling the enterprise liability theory articulated
in Kasel. Kosters v. Seven-Up Co. is the seminal case applying this theory
of liability. 141 In Kosters, the court applied Michigan's version of strict
liability to Seven-Up, a trademark licensor/franchisor, in an action for in-
juries resulting from a poorly designed soda pop carton. Seven-Up neither
manufactured nor supplied the defective carton, nor did it require its fran-
chisees to use it. However, Seven-Up did specifically consent to the car-
ton's use by its franchisee, The Brooks Bottling Company, which had bot-
tled the soft drink contained in the carton.
The court held that when a trademark licensor/franchisor consents to
the distribution of a defective product bearing its name, its obligation to
compensate an injured consumer for breach of implied warranty arises
from several factors in combination: (1) the risk created by approving for
distribution an unsafe product likely to cause injury; (2) the franchisor's
ability and opportunity to eliminate the unsafe character of the product and
to prevent loss; (3) the consumer's lack of knowledge of the danger; and
(4) the consumer's reliance on the trade name which gives the intended
police the transmission fluid that was manufactured and sold under the Dextron II trademark. It as-
serted that the Lanham Act placed an affirmative duty on GM to implement such a program and that
GM's failure to do so was a basis for imposing negligence liability on GM. The court disagreed,
finding that no court had imposed a tort duty on a trademark licensor as a result of the Lanham Act's
quality control requirement. See id. at 33-34. Second, Petrol Plus argued that GM should be held
strictly liable under the "apparent manufacturer" theory as set forth in section 400 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. The court erroneously stited that there is no difference between the apparent
manufacturer doctrine and the stream of commerce theory articulated in cases like Kasel. See id. at 33
n.l 1. The court then proceeded to analyze Petrol Plus' claim against the backdrop of both doctrines.
The court noted that the apparent manufacturer doctrine does not apply unless a trademark licensor
"puts out" a product as its own by "sale, lease, gift or loan." See id. The court then held that because
GM had done none of these things, it could not be liable as an apparent manufacturer. The court also
observed that the apparent manufacturer doctrine had been applied only when the use of a trademark
led a purchaser to believe that the licensor had itself produced the goods. The court found that this
requirement was not met here because "[a]lthough the Dextron II trademark did appear on Atlantic
Coast's packaging, Atlantic Coast also used its own trade name 'Kenmore' on the containers." Id. at
26.
141. 595 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1979). See also Harris v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 550 F. Supp. 1024
(W.D. Va. 1982) (following Kosters and holding a franchisor/licensor liable under warranty theory
where the franchisor caused the product to enter commerce, extensively promoted the sales of the
product, and controlled the specifications and requirements of the product). But see Burkert, 579 A.2d
at 35-36 (rejecting application of the implied warranty theory to a trademark licensor who published
performance standards for the licensed product and required licensees' products to be tested by an
outside laboratory, but who was not otherwise involved in the manufacture, distribution, or sale of the
product, and did not profit from it).
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impression that the franchisor/licensor is responsible for and stands behind
the product.'42
While the Kosters language is sweeping, the case turned on the fact
that Seven-Up expressly approved the use of the defective carton.
143
Seven-Up also required its licensee to submit specimens of its products for
safety inspection, and such an inspection did actually occur. 144 The court
stated that "[w]ith knowledge of its design, Seven-Up consented to the en-
try in commerce of the carton from which the bottle fell, causing the in-
jury. ' 145 The court found that Seven-Up's liability was "based on [its]
control and the public's assumption, induced by the franchisor's conduct,
that it does in fact control and vouch for the product."'
146
In cases applying the enterprise liability theory and other similar
theories, courts tend to treat heavily involved licensors as the true produc-
ers of the licensed goods and treat their licensees as subordinate entities.
Courts frequently state that they do not rely on traditional agency princi-
ples,- presumably because a common law agency relationship requires a
showing of day-to-day control which cannot be established. Instead,
courts purport to rely on strict liability rationales generally, and on the
vague notion that certain licensors can fall within these rationales if they
have a "participatory connection" or are "significantly involved" with the
operations of their licensees. In making this assessment, courts look at a
variety of factors, including whether the licensor retains the rights to con-
trol the quality of the licensed goods, and does in fact exercise that right in
some manner. Courts also consider whether consumers are likely to rely
on the licensors' trademark as a symbol of quality. Finally, in most of
these cases, courts have imposed strict liability on licensors who supplied
their licensees with specifications or standards for manufacturing, design-
ing, or warranting the goods. As I show below, the enterprise liability the-
ory is unnecessarily vague and muddled in several respects.
IV. UNTANGLING THE ENTERPRISE LIABILITY WEB
In this part, I first discuss the general problems with the enterprise li-
ability theory, focusing on the fact that courts have not developed clear
tests for imposing strict liability on trademark licensors. I then set forth
some of the reasons why courts have had difficulty articulating clear tests







in this area. Finally, I focus particularly on the Torres cases, because they
illustrate many of the problems with the enterprise liability theory in the
trademark licensing context.
A. GENERAL PROBLEMS WITH THE ENTERPRISE THEORY
In the case law to date, the application of enterprise liability theory to
trademark licensors poses a number of problems. First, courts have failed
to develop a coherent theory about the proper role of a trademark licensor.
This failure has resulted in the lack of a clear, formalized starting pre-
sumption as to whether a trademark licensor generally should be subject to
strict liability. For example, some courts have suggested that a "mere li-
censor" might not be subject to strict liability, 147 while other courts have
suggested that all licensors should be subject to strict liability because of
factors that are inherent in every licensing arrangement.
148
The lack of a clear theory regarding the proper role of a trademark li-
censor has also resulted in vague and highly indeterminate "tests" for es-
tablishing when to hold a particular licensor strictly liable. Courts have
justified the imposition of strict liability on trademark licensors on the
grounds that they had a "participatory connection" with, were an "integral
link in," or "substantially participated" in the enterprise that placed the de-
fective goods into the stream of commerce. 149 However, courts have nei-
ther defined these terms nor articulated clear standards for determining
whether or why particular licensor conduct should be deemed sufficiently
"significant" to justify imputing a manufacturer's strict liability to a
trademark licensor. Similarly, although courts have recited a number of
"factors" that should be considered in assessing licensor liability, they
have not indicated whether any one of these factors is more important than
others, or whether a certain number of factors must be present before strict
liability will be imposed. Instead, courts frequently "mix" together
loosely-defined vicarious liability concepts with products liability ration-
ales to create a "soup" of factors that somehow justifies imposing strict li-
ability on a particular trademark licensor. The failure to untangle separate
147. See Torres II, 786 P.2d 939, 945 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc) ("If we were to deal with 'nothing
but a mere licensor'--one who merely licenses a manufacturer to use a particular... trademark-it
might well be inappropriate to impose strict liability.").
148. See Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., 389 N.E.2d 155, 163 (IM. 1979) ("A licensor is an integral
part of the marketing enterprise, and its participation in the profits reaped by placing a defective prod-
uct in the stream of commerce... presents the same public policy reasons for the applicability of
strict liability which supported the imposition of such liability on wholesalers, retailers and lessors.").
149. See supra Part III.
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and distinct theories of liability renders the opinions in this area highly in-
determinate and of little predictive value.
The lack of a clear theory of a trademark licensor role has also re-
sulted in confusion regarding the differences between licensor involvement
and licensor control. In other contexts, vicarious liability typically follows
control, not mere involvement. Courts have not explained why vicarious
liability in the trademark licensing context should be any different.
Moreover, to the extent "control" is determinative in these cases, courts
have not adequately addressed the following factors: (1) the distinction
between the right to control and the exercise of control; (2) the type of
control that should be grounds for strict liability; or (3) the weight that
should be given to Lanham Act control.
Finally, as a general matter, courts have not considered the economic
and insurance implications of exposing trademark licensors to strict liabil-
ity. Strict liability has been subjected to mounting criticism, principally on
the ground that it is an inefficient form of product accident insurance.
150
There may be merit to this criticism, especially given the escalating costs
of strict liability insurance and legal defense against strict liability claims.
These costs are invariably passed onto consumers in the form of increased
prices.
The question of whether the collective costs of such insurance are
worth the benefits has been the subject of much debate. 151 In light of this
debate, it would seem advisable for courts and legislatures to carefully
consider the economic consequences of extending strict liability to trade-
mark licensors. Indeed, if other entities in the chain of distribution-
manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers-already purchase strict liability in-
surance for a particular product, and if it is questionable whether the costs
of such insurance are worth its benefits, it would appear to be more ques-
tionable to make yet another entity-a trademark licensor-purchase an
overlapping layer of insurance for the same product. To date, these issues
have not been adequately addressed in enterprise liability cases. Below, I
150. See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS COSTS, 165-69 (1988);
JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION 74
(1986); Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645, 668-
69 (1985); Deborah R. Hensler, Trends in Tort Litigation: Findings from the Institute for Civil Jus-
tice's Research, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 479, 493 (1987); Jeffrey O'Connell, Alternatives to the Tort System
of Personal Injury, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 17, 21 (1986); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance
Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1534-39 (1987); Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away
with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555, 596 (1985).
151. See sources cited in supra note 150.
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explore some of the reasons why courts have had difficulty developing a
coherent theory and clear tests in this area of law.
B. THE DILEMMA
A review of the cases indicates that a number of reasons exist for the
courts' difficulty in articulating a cogent theory of, and clear tests for,
trademark licensor liability. First, the decisions are not based on a coher-
ent theory about the proper role of a trademark licensor. That is, the deci-
sions lack a general view as to whether licensors should or should not par-
ticipate in their licensees' affairs, and if so, to what extent or in what
manner. Many of the cases apply the notion that extensive or substantial
participation is grounds for imposing vicarious liability on a trademark li-
censor. While this notion implies that a passive licensor will not be ex-
posed to such liability, 152 courts do not explain why this should be so.
Second, courts have not been explicit about what they are doing.
Courts applying the enterprise liability theory imply or expressly state that
they are not applying vicarious liability principles. 153 They assert that they
merely apply "the underlying rationales" of strict liability, where war-
ranted, to particular trademark licensors. This cannot be correct. If courts
were simply analyzing whether the underlying rationales of strict liability
support its extension to licensors, they would not need to discuss whether a
particular licensor "controlled," "had the right to control," or was
"significantly involved" in the affairs of its licensee. These issues are not
normally relevant to whether a manufacturer or other seller is subject to
strict liability. The intensive focus on "control," "significant involve-
ment," and "participatory connection" indicates that courts are in fact ap-
plying some form of vicarious liability. Indeed, one can view the enter-
prise liability theory primarily as a muddled form of vicarious liability
dressed up in products liability garb.
Third, the nature of the trademark licensing relationship makes it dif-
ficult for courts to develop a clear test for imposing strict liability on licen-
sors based on vicarious liability principles. Normally, vicarious liability is
imposed when two parties are involved in an agency relationship. In an
agency relationship, because the principal clearly controls the agent's acts,
the principal is thus liable for those acts because liability follows control.
At the opposite end of the spectrum are independent contractors. The in-
dependent contractor usually is not under the control of the entity that
152. See Torres HI, 786 P.2d at 945.
153. See, e.g.., Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 101 Cal. Rptr. 314, 323 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
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hired it; the relationship between the parties is contractual and neither
party is liable for the acts of the other. The licensing relationship, on the
other hand, generally does not fit neatly into either of these categories, but
rather fits somewhere between these two extremes. 154 Some licensors may
completely control and dominate their licensees, while other licensors may
share control and decisionmaking with their licensees. Further along the
spectrum, some licensors may merely offer advice or suggestions to its li-
censees but exercise no control. Still other licensors may have no in-
volvement whatsoever and leave all the decisionmaking and control to the
licensees.
Fourth, the quality control requirement, as established under the
common law and in the federal Lanham Act, adds another layer of ambi-
guity to these cases. Licensors are required by the Lanham Act to main-
tain sufficient control over licensees to ensure a consistent quality of all
goods bearing the same mark.155 This requirement helps protect consum-
ers who expect that similarly branded goods are of a similar quality.
156
Failure to meet this requirement leads to a licensor's loss of the right to
prevent others from using the mark, for the licensor is deemed to have
abandoned its mark. Despite the grave consequences of failing to meet the
control requirement, neither the Lanham Act nor the courts have clearly
defined the scope of the requirement. Some courts, for example, have held
that the licensor must actually exercise some type of quality control; others
have upheld licensing arrangements that merely provide the licensor with
the contractual right to exercise such control. Still others have permitted
licensors to rely on their licensees for quality control.
Because of this quality control requirement, virtually every trademark
license contains boilerplate language giving the licensor the "right to con-
trol the quality" of the licensed goods. Thus, even if a particular licensor
is not involved at all in its licensee's operations, it will appear to be in-
volved by virtue of the licensing agreement. Such clauses make it difficult
for courts to determine the extent, nature, or purpose of a licensor's control
in a particular case. As a result, the quality control requirement may make
it difficult for judges to articulate an all-encompassing test or to dispose of
these cases as a matter of summary judgment.
Although the licensing relationship cannot easily be categorized ei-
ther as an agency relationship or as an independent contractor relationship,
154. See supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
155. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5)(A) (1994), amended by Trademark Law Treaty Implementation
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-330, 112 Stat. 3064 (1998).
156. See supra Part II.D.
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judges frequently find that a particular licensor is sufficiently involved or
sufficiently in control to justify imputing the licensee's strict liability to
the licensor. In these cases, courts have been persuaded that the licensors
were in some sense the "masterminds" behind, or at least significant play-
ers in, the enterprise that produced the defective product. In such circum-
stances, courts reason that it would be inequitable to allow the licensor to
escape liability through the "simple maneuver" of entering into a licensing
arrangement-particularly where the plaintiffs ability to recover against
the manufacturer was uncertain.
However, courts do in fact apply a loosely defined form of vicarious
liability in the enterprise liability cases. 157 Indeed, if vicarious liability
was not the predominant issue, courts would not need to extensively cite
any available evidence of licensor control and involvement to support their
decisions. The courts are not "wrong" in most of these cases in terms of
fundamental fairness or justice; they have simply not developed a consis-
tent set of rules or even a coherent theory to explain their decisions. An
examination of these cases results in the knowledge that the decisions were
correct, but one cannot articulate a test, principle, or standard to explain
why the cases were correctly decided. Nor can one predict when a licensor
will be held liable in similar circumstances in a subsequent case.
Finally, courts may be reluctant to develop clear rules here for fear
that such rules will enable licensors to carefully manipulate licensing ar-
rangements to retain practical control over their licensees without facing
liability under the letter of the law. Courts may fear that, as a result of
such manipulation, they will not be able to impose strict liability on licen-
sors though strong equitable reasons exist for doing so.
While this may be a valid concern, it is not distinctive of trademark
licensing. Every area of law faces the same dilemma. The clearer the rule,
the better one can avoid it. The fear of manipulation alone, however, can-
not justify a standardless, ad-hoc approach. Even putting aside the fact
that people have a fundamental right to know what the law is before they
break it,158 it is generally recognized that clear rules enable more efficient
business planning which, in turn, should inure to the benefit of society.
157. Enterprise liability theory is rooted in a long tradition of vicarious liability principles. See
George Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations
of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 463-64 (1985).
158. See Secretary of Labor, U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1539 (7th Cir.
1987) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
People are entitled to know the legal rules before they act, and only the most compelling
reason should lead a court to announce an approach under which no one can know where he
stands until litigation has been completed. Litigation is costly and introduces risk into any
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C. FOCUSING ON TORRES AS AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE
The Arizona Supreme Court's decision in Torres II and its application
by the Ninth Circuit in Torres III illustrate several of the fundamental
problems with the enterprise liability theory. In Torres II, the Arizona Su-
preme Court held that a trademark licensor is subject to strict liability un-
der the enterprise liability theory if it "significantly participates" in the op-
erations of its licensee.'59 Applying this test, the Ninth Circuit held that
Goodyear could be held strictly liable for an allegedly defective tire that
was designed, manufactured, and sold by its foreign subsidiaries under a
trademark licensing contract with Goodyear. 160 The courts' decisions in
Torres II and Torres III are problematic for several reasons.
First, both courts ignore the realities of trademark licensing generally,
and the quality control requirement in particular. The Arizona Supreme
Court announced a test that requires the plaintiff to prove only that a
trademark licensor had the "right to control" the "incidents of manufac-
ture;" the plaintiff need not show actual control by the licensor.161 But the
court did not discuss the fact that nearly all trademark licensors, by virtue
of their duties under the Lanham Act, are required to contractually retain
the right to control the quality of the licensed goods.
Hence, any trademark licensor who does not wish to abandon its mark
will include boilerplate quality control provisions in its licensing agree-
ment with its licensees. Indeed, those provisions may even refer to a non-
existent quality control program as if it were, in fact, in operation. This is
especially likely to occur in the collateral and promotional licensing con-
texts because such licensors are not well positioned to monitor the quality
of the licensed goods. When licensors with such programs are sued, they
some obstacle such as inexperience with the subject, a dearth of fact, or a vacuum in the
statute books intervenes, we should be able to attach legal consequences to recurrent factual
patterns.
Id. See also R. Bales, Libertarianism, Environmentalism, and Utilitarianism: An Examination of
Theoretical Frameivorks for Enforcing Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 1993 DET. C.L.
REV. 1163, 1220 (arguing that indeterminacy breeds litigation).
159. See Torres 111, 901 F.2d 750,750-51 (9th Cir. 1990).
As a common law matter, trademark licensors who significantly participate in the overall
process by which the product reaches its consumers, and who have the right to control the
incidents of manufacture or distribution, are subject to liability under the rules of Restate-
ment § 402A as adopted and applied in Arizona.
Id. (quoting Torres 11, 786 P.2d 939, 946 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc)) (emphasis added).
160. See id. at 751 ("There is no question that Goodyear's involvement in the overall process by
which the tires in question reached the Torres' fits the above description.").
161. See Torres 11, 786 P.2d at 946-47, 948.
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are unlikely to argue that they did not exercise control, since such an ad-
mission could provide the basis for a finding of abandonment.
Thus, any test that relies on contractual averments of control, or on
the mere right to control, will probably include virtually all licensors. In
Torres II, the court was willing to premise liability on the "right to con-
trol" because that was all the plaintiff was able to prove at the summary
judgment stage. The court, however, strongly suspected that Goodyear
had in fact exercised substantial control over the product through its status
as a parent corporation. By articulating the standard in this manner, the
court adopted a test that is incapable of distinguishing among licensors,
since almost all licensors have a contractual right to control the quality of
the licensed goods.
More fundamentally, the courts in Torres II and Torres III failed to
explain why a mere "right to control" provides any support for imposing
strict liability on a trademark licensor. Ordinarily, a "right" does not cre-
ate a "duty." Indeed, the courts' reliance on the "right to control" as a ba-
sis for strict liability is particularly odd given the fact that the vast majority
of courts have held that a licensor's Lanham-Act-based right to control
does not create a legal duty to control, such that the failure to control is
grounds for a negligence claim. 162
Second, the Torres II court's significant involvement test was highly
indeterminate. The court did not provide any guidelines for lower courts
to use in deciding what constitutes significant involvement. Rather, the
court referred to two conceptually distinct categories: "mere licensors" and
"significantly involved licensors." The court implied that the former
should not be subject to strict liability and held that the latter should be
subject to such liability. 163 However, aside from pointing to the facts of
the case before it, the court did not set standards to determine either how
much or what type of involvement should be considered significant. Al-
though the court did say that licensors who meet the significant involve-
162. See, e.g., Mini Maid Servs. Co. v. Maid Brigade Sys., Inc., 967 F.2d 1516, 1520 (11th Cir.
1992) ("[A] trademark owner's failure to exercise control [does not] subjecto] the owner to affirmative
liability in tort .... ') (quoting Burkert, 579 A.2d at 32); Oberlin v. Marlin Am. Corp., 596 F.2d
1322, 1327 (7th Cir. 1979) ("[s]cope of the duty of supervision associated with a registered trademark
is commensurate with th[e] narrow purpose" of ensuring the integrity of the mark); Burkert v. Petrol
Plus of Naugatuck, Inc., 579 A.2d 26, 32 (Conn. 1990) (holding that the Lanham Act requirement that
a licensor of trademarks exercise control over its licensees and over quality of product bearing its
trademarks does not give rise to a duty owed to persons upon whom a negligence action could be
based; the sole consequence of a violation of the Lanham Act requirement is loss of rights associated
with the trademark).
163. See Torres 11, 786 P.2d at 945.
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ment test are "the functional equivalent of manufacturers and sellers," it
did not explain what type of conduct makes a licensor the functional
equivalent of either a manufacturer or a seller. 164 Indeed, the court did not
even identify the particular involvement of Goodyear which it considered
especially significant.
Thus, under Torres II and Torres III, plaintiffs are free to discover
everything they can about a licensor's involvement and to argue that that
involvement is "significant." Judges who wish to hold trademark licensors
liable can simply agree and label the involvement "significant." Con-
versely, judges who do not wish to hold trademark licensors liable can
dismiss as "insignificant" virtually any involvement that falls short of ex-
tensive and actual control over day-to-day operations. The Torres II court
has thus created a "rule" that amounts to nothing more than "I know it
when I see it." Applying this rule, lower courts have virtually uncontrolled
discretion to impose or not impose strict liability on trademark licensors.
In short, the Torres courts have created a "test" that is no test at all.
Third, the "significant involvement" test does not appear to be based
on any coherent theory of tort liability. Normally, vicarious liability fol-
lows control, not mere involvement. While control is itself a nebulous
concept, it is not as nebulous as the significant involvement test estab-
lished in Torres. Indeed, Torres can be seen as simply displacing tradi-
tional vicarious liability principles with vague involvement principles. 165
In the name of enterprise liability, the court blends traditional rationales
underlying strict liability with loosely defined principles of "involvement."
However, it is not clear why an entity which is merely involved in the af-
fairs of another company should be held liable for the latter company's
acts.
In no other area of law is mere involvement a basis for liability. In
fact, one could argue that licensors should be involved in the affairs of
their licensees, and should give their licensees advice when appropriate
without thereby incurring the risk of strict liability. A legal regime that
164. Id. at 947.
165. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's affirmation of the jury verdict on remand that Good-
year USA was strictly liable but its foreign subsidiaries were exonerated, see supra note 134. The
Ninth Circuit's holding that Goodyear's liability was "direct" rather than "derivative" is puzzling. To
justify its finding that Goodyear's liability was "direct," the Ninth Circuit stated that the jury could
have found Goodyear liable based on its "extensive control" over its foreign subsidiaries. See Torres
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., No. 94-15092, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 20375, (9th Cir. July 13,
1995) (unpublished table decision). But the court nowhere found, or indicated that the jury could
have found, that Goodyear's conduct was a direct cause of the product defect or plaintiff's injuries.
Thus, it is difficult to understand why the court believed Goodyear's liability was "direct."
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encourages instead of punishes such involvement would create incentives
for licensors to enhance product safety.
It might be argued that the Torres test is justified on some form of
"partnership" or "joint venture" principles. Generally, partners or joint
venturers are independent entities doing business in a "partnership" form.
Each joint venturer or partner has a share of "control" over the partner-
ship's affairs. Each is fully liable for the acts of the partnership, even if
the partner who is sued did not personally participate in those acts. The
Torres court may have seen "significantly involved" licensors as
"partners" with their licensee. But if this is so, the court completely side-
stepped the fact that in a partnership there is "shared control," not merely
shared "involvement," and there is a sharing of both profits and losses. By
contrast, in a licensing arrangement the licensor's control may be illusory
and typically there is no loss sharing.
Fourth, in Torres II, the court essentially performed an "end run"
around the doctrine of limited liability when it cited Goodyear's "indirect"
control over its subsidiaries to establish the requisite nexus of significant
involvement. If the opinion is taken literally, then any licensor who is also
a controlling shareholder is "significantly involved" in the overall process
by which the licensed goods reach their consumers. If this is the rule, a
parent corporation automatically forfeits the protection of the corporate
veil when it enters into a trademark license with its subsidiary. As I dis-
cuss more fully in Part V, it is not altogether clear why a trademark license
should so easily destroy the protections afforded by the veil.
Fifth, in Torres I, the Ninth Circuit invited the Arizona Supreme
Court to consider a number of economic issues when deciding the certified
question. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the Arizona court
consider whether holding trademark licensors strictly liable would ad-
versely affect the economy by increasing the total amount of dollars spent
on product liability insurance and legal fees-costs which invariably are
passed onto consumers in the form of increased prices. 166 The Ninth Cir-
cuit noted that "[t]hings are not what they were twenty-five years ago"
when section 402A was first introduced, that "it is now realized that the
cost of 402A insurance is very substantial," and that it "is a significant part
of the cost of many items."
' 167
The Arizona Supreme Court dismissed these concerns out of hand. It
noted that although Kasel applied strict liability to licensors in California,
166. See Torres 1, 867 F.2d 1234, 1238-39 (9th Cir. 1989).
167. Id.
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there was no mass exodus of manufacturers or other business entities
fleeing California for Arizona.' 68 The Supreme Court also noted that the
imposition of strict liability on Goodyear in this case would likely have no
discernible impact on insurance payments, since the related companies
probably had joint insurance. 169 As demonstrated more fully below, the
Arizona court's analysis of the economic issues at stake is entirely too su-
perficial, 170 focusing too much on this particular case, with little thought to
the larger economic implications. Strong arguments can be made that the
"tests" articulated in Kasel and Torres will make it commercially neces-
sary for all trademark licensors to purchase 402A insurance-neither a
desirable nor necessary result.
Sixth, Torres is another example of a case where a foreign subsidi-
ary/licensee may have been outside the jurisdiction of the court.171 The
possibility that the plaintiff would not have had any recovery if the trade-
mark licensor was not held strictly liable loomed large in the court's mind.
Indeed, the Arizona Supreme Court expressly stated that the foreign tire
manufacturer and foreign design firm might not have been subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction in Arizona. 172 The court also noted that the district court
had denied plaintiff's motion to add the foreign companies.' 73 Although
the court mentioned this concern near the end of its opinion, it may in fact
have been a driving force in the court's thinking. The court undoubtedly
was correct in noting it would be unfair to allow an American company to
shield itself from product liability by "outsourcing" the design or manufac-
ture of its goods to foreign licensees who were beyond the jurisdictional
reach of American courts. However, as demonstrated below, there may be
a way around this problem without resorting to the broad and indetermi-
nate "significant involvement" test adopted in Torres.
V. TOWARD A MORE COHERENT MODEL OF LICENSOR
LIABILITY LAW
This part explores whether it is possible to construct a more coherent
model of licensor liability law. The challenge is to construct a set of clear,
yet still sufficiently flexible, vicarious liability rules that (1) do not require
168. See Torres II, 786 P.2d at 947 n.6. Perhaps the exodus was not as pronounced then as it is
now.
169. See id. at 946.
170. See infra Part V.
171. See also Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); Connelly
v. Uniroyal, Inc., 389 N.E.2d 155 (Il1. 1979).




a showing of an agency relationship; (2) account for the fact that licensors
and licensees often share control or jointly participate in the production of
the licensed goods; (3) distinguish between Lanham Act control and the
type of control that ought to be the basis for imposing strict liability on li-
censors; (4) identify in advance the types of involvement that will be
deemed sufficiently significant to justify imputing a manufacturer's strict
liability to a trademark licensor; and (5) capture licensors who attempt to
improperly shield themselves, or their licensees, from strict liability.' 74 It
is possible to construct a model of licensor liability law that fulfills these
goals by borrowing the basic analytical framework and certain key con-
cepts from corporate veil piercing law.
A. TREATING LICENSORS LIKE OTHER INVESTORS
In the corporate context, courts have been faced with the similar di-
lemma of identifying the circumstances under which it is appropriate to
impose vicarious liability on a particular stockholder in the absence of an
agency relationship between the investor and the corporation in which the
investor owns stock. The challenge in that context has been to develop a
set of clear, flexible rules for imposing vicarious liability on stockholders
who either exercise inordinate control over their corporations, or who oth-
erwise improperly manipulate their relationship with the corporation to es-
cape personal liability.
Over a long period of time, courts have developed a basic organiza-
tional structure and a fairly clear set of tests to deal with this problem. The
structure begins with a presumption that stockholders who are mere inves-
tors are not personally liable for the acts of the corporation in which they
own stock.175 In common parlance, this presumption is referred to as the
rule of "limited liability" for stockholders. 176 It is called "limited liabil-
ity," as opposed to "nonliability," because stockholders remain at risk to
lose their capital investment in the corporation if the corporation goes
bankrupt. For all practical purposes, however, the presumption of limited
liability is, in reality, a presumption of shareholder nonliability.
174. This Article focuses on vicarious licensor liability, not direct licensor liability. A licensor
would be held directly liable for its licensee's torts if the licensor was directly involved in the licen-
see's tortious conduct, and if the licensor's wrongful conduct was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs
harm. It is the absence of such a direct causal relationship between the licensor's acts and the plain-
tiff's harm that distinguishes vicarious liability from direct liability.
175. See, e.g., Johnson v. Flowers Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 978, 980 (4th Cir. 1987) ("Under the
doctrine of limited liability, a shareholder is not responsible for the acts of a corporation.").
176. See generally FLETCHER, supra note 14, §§ 41-44.
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The rationale for the rule of limited liability is that it will encourage
more people to invest in more companies, thereby strengthening the
overall economic well being of the community.'77 Although the soundness
of this rationale has been questioned, 178 the presumption of limited stock-
holder liability continues to be the general rule throughout the United
States as well as in many countries around the world.
In the corporate law context, the presumption of limited liability re-
mains intact so long as the investor plays by the rules of corporate law.
Those rules include, inter alia, adequately capitalizing the corporation,
electing a board of directors to manage the corporation, not exercising ex-
cessive control over corporate affairs, and otherwise recognizing the
"separate corporate existence" of the corporation. 179  If a stockholder
breaks these rules, the presumption of limited liability may be discarded.
After a long experience with investors who attempted to manipulate
the corporate form-that is, those who attempted to take advantage of the
protection of limited liability without playing by the rules of corporate
law-courts developed a panoply of tests for "piercing" through the fiction
of the corporate veil in particular circumstances. 180 The precise character
of these tests varies from state to state. As a general matter, 11 the corpo-
rate veil may be pierced if a particular stockholder (1) exercises such ex-
tensive control over corporate affairs that it is the "alter ego" of the corpo-
ration; 8 2 (2) exercises control over the particular area of corporate
177. See Johnson, 814 F.2d at 980 ("The underlying purpose of limited liability is to stimulate
business investment by permitting individuals to take action in corporate form without the risk of di-
rect liability or involvement.") (citing Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
As the Fourth Circuit noted in Johnson, "[b]usiness investment is further encouraged by granting lim-
ited liability to corporations that form subsidiaries because 'if a parent corporation is held liable for
the obligations of its subsidiary, the shareholders of the parent are hurt, through the lowering of the
value of their investment in the parent."' Id. (quoting William P. Hackney & Tracey G. Benson,
Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 U. Prrr. L. REv. 837, 872-73 (1983)).
178. See, e.g., David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L.
REv. 1565, 1619 (1991) (arguing that veil piercing should be more common in tort cases).
179. See generally FLETCHER, supra note 14, §§ 41,41.10,41.25,44.1.
180. See id.
181. This is offered as an illustrative list of piercing factors. It is not intended to be a compre-
hensive list of piercing tests in the corporate law context. For a comprehensive discussion of the vari-
ous grounds courts have used to pierce the corporate veil, see FLETCHER, supra note 14, §§ 41-45. As
Fletcher makes clear, veil piercing is an "equitable remedy" which should remain sufficiently flexible
to capture shareholders that abuse the privilege of doing business in the corporate form. See id.
§ 41.25.
182. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 14, §§ 41.10 (discussing "alter ego" piercing test), 43.10
(discussing "mere instrumentality" piercing test).
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decisionmaking that gave rise to the plaintiff's claim;183 or (3) has stripped
the corporation of assets such that it cannot meet reasonably foreseeable
obligations, including tort claims. 
184
0 It is my central contention in this Article that licensor liability law,
particularly in the strict liability context, would benefit from an organiza-
tional structure that mirrors the basic structure of corporate veil piercing
law. By basic structure, I mean an explicit and formalized initial pre-
sumption of nonliability, coupled with clear yet flexible piercing tests. In
the licensing context, these tests should similarly focus on whether the li-
censor has exercised excessive control, operated through a grossly under-
capitalized "shell" or "front" licensee, or otherwise improperly manipu-
lated the licensing arrangement to shield itself or its licensees from strict
liability. Although the specific equitable grounds for piercing in the li-
censing context probably will be somewhat different than in the share-
holder context, the general approach should be the same.
In the sections that follow, I first explore the feasibility and justifi-
ability of adopting an initial presumption of nonliability for trademark li-
censors. I then consider five tests that might be used to pierce the
"licensing veil" in appropriate circumstances.
B. JUSTIFYING AN INITIAL PRESUMPTION OF NONLIABILITY
FOR TRADEMARK LICENSORS
There are a number of significant similarities between stockholders
and licensors that make it particularly compelling to adopt a similar initial
presumption of investor nonliability in the licensing context. First, trade-
mark licensors, like corporate stockholders, are entities which invest
"capital" in another entity for the primary purpose of realizing financial
gain. While the stockholder invests money, the licensor invests the repu-
tational, and hence economic value of his trade name or trademark. Sec-
ond, in both situations, the future financial success of the enterprise de-
183. See, e.g., Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir.
1929) (L. Hand, J.) (permitting veil piercing where shareholder participates in transaction that gives
rise to plaintiff's claim).
In order to prevent the "direct participation" theory of [vicarious] liability from extinguish-
ing the general rule of parent corporation immunity from the obligations of a subsidiary, that
theory must be carefully limited to situations in which the parent corporation's control over
particular transactions is exercised in disregard of the separate corporate [paraphernalia] of
the subsidiary.
Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739,759 (7th Cir. 1989).
184. See FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 44.1 (discussing the "inadequate capitalization" piercing
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pends in part on the investors' contribution of capital. Third, trademark
licensors, like stockholders, typically agree to share in profits but not
losses generated by the venture. Fourth, trademark licensors, like stock-
holders, are legally required to exercise some type of control over their
"investees."185 Finally, like stockholders, licensors can be either active or
passive participants in the investment enterprise.
Corporate law has long recognized a presumption of limited liability
for stockholders on the theory that such a rule will stimulate greater in-
vestment and thus contribute to the overall economic good of society. The
same rationale arguably justifies a similar presumption in the licensing
context. Indeed, the sheer volume of trademark licensing in the United
States is evidence that such licensing stimulates the free flow of capital
and economic growth, and is highly attractive as a form of investing. Like
other investors, licensors are more likely to risk their "capital" if they
know there is some way to limit their potential exposure to product liabil-
ity suits, and if there are clear ground rules for determining when the nor-
mal presumption will be ignored.'
8 6
Even so, while the stockholder analogy is compelling, it is by no
means a necessary foundation for the general position I advance here.
Even if one does not fully accept the licensor-stockholder analogy, there
are strong reasons to afford licensors an initial presumption of nonliability.
As stated above, the law must start some place. It must presume either that
licensors generally are subject to strict liability and create "exceptions" to
the general rule, or start with the presumption that licensors generally are
not subject to strict liability and develop legal "tests" for disregarding that
general rule. Without some sort of general rule, all parties-licensors, li-
censees, plaintiffs, and the court system-are lost at sea.
Moreover, besides organizing the law in this area, such a presumption
would recognize the important differences that exist between different
classical, collateral, and promotional licensors. Classical licensors typi-
cally dictate standards and specifications for their products, whereas pro-
motional and collateral licensors typically function as relatively passive
investors. The proposed approach would account for these differences by
185. By statute, stockholders together elect corporate directors and establish their duties in the
corporate bylaws. See FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 2.22. The Lanham Act itself requires licensors to
exercise some form of control over the quality of the licensed goods. See supra Part lI.D.
186. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. Moreover, the law must make a starting pre-
sumption that a licensor is or is not subject to strict liability. Indeed, it would appear that a presump-
tion of nonliability already is inherent in the enterprise liability theory, since it imposes strict liability
only on licensors who are "significantly involved" in their licensees' affairs.
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affording all licensors an initial presumption of nonliability, but still allow-
ing plaintiffs to rebut this presumption with proof that a particular licensor
had engaged in activity that made it equitable to hold it strictly liable under
one of the proposed tests.
Formalizing an initial presumption of licensor nonliability is consis-
tent with the approach taken in many of the enterprise liability cases. Most
courts have been reluctant to start with the presumption that all trademark
licensors are strictly liable. In Torres II, for example, the Arizona Su-
preme Court strongly implied that a "mere licensor" would not be subject
to strict liability.187 Similarly, the recently released Restatement (Third) of
Torts states that products liability generally attaches to licensors who sub-
stantially participate in their licensees' affairs, thus implying that such li-
ability would not attach absent such participation. 188 Hence, to date the
case law indicates that courts implicitly do start with a presumption that
minimally involved licensors should not be subject to such liability.
Of course, an argument can be made that such a presumption is in-
consistent with licensor's quality control obligations under the Lanham
Act. Indeed, it seems odd to say that licensors have a legal duty to police
their licensees for quality, but then to presume that licensors are basically
passive investors and thus entitled to a presumption of nonliability. If such
quality control is required to occur in every licensing arrangement, then
arguably no licensor is entitled to such a presumption.
This argument is compelling and cannot be easily brushed aside.
However, I do not think it fatal to my basic thesis for two reasons. First,
the quality control requirement is highly indeterminate. 189 It has been
soundly criticized, principally on the ground that it is based on a theory of
trademarks and trademark licensing that applies, if at all, only in the clas-
sical licensing context. Classical licensors typically license their marks to
licensees in connection with goods that the licensor previously manufac-
tured itself under the same mark. In such circumstances, it might make
sense to require the licensor to police its licensees' goods to ensure a uni-
form quality. However, even in that context, it is not at all clear what
187. See Torres II, 786 P.2d 939, 945 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc).
188. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 14 cmt. d (1997)
("Trademark licensors are liable for harm caused by defective products distributed under the licensor's
trademark or logo when they participate substantially in the design, manufacture, or distribution of the
licensee's products. In these circumstances they are treated as sellers of the products bearing their
trademarks.").
189. See supra Part II.D.
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"uniform quality" means, since manufacturers' own goods frequently are
of an uneven quality.
If one moves away from the classical licensing context, the quality
control requirement becomes even more unworkable. One cannot rea-
sonably expect a collateral or promotional licensor to police its licensees'
goods to determine whether they are of the same quality as other goods
bearing the same mark, because the licensor has never manufactured other,
similar goods under that mark. Thus, the licensor could not possibly de-
velop meaningful standards to ensure uniform quality.
Whatever the quality control requirement means, no court has held
that it means licensors must determine whether their licensee's products
were manufactured, designed free from defects, were not unreasonably
dangerous, or were labeled with appropriate warnings. Indeed, courts have
held exactly the opposite. Almost every court to address this issue has
recognized that the Lanham Act quality control requirement exists mainly
to protect the trademark licensor's ownership rights in its mark and is not
the basis for a tort duty. 190
Finally, courts have not clearly indicated either the type or degree of
control that a licensor must exercise to satisfy the Lanham Act require-
ment. 191 Some courts have required licensors to institute some type of
formal, albeit minimal, quality control program, which includes inspecting
the licensed goods. Other courts have been satisfied if the licensor merely
retained the right to control the quality of the goods. Still others have
permitted licensing where the licensor relied on a well-established licensee
for quality control. Indeed, one court recently held that the quality control
requirement does not apply at all to promotional licensors.
1 92
In these uncertain waters, one cannot reasonably conclude that the
quality control requirement in and of itself mandates that licensors be more
than mere investors. Nor can one persuasively argue that such a require-
ment negates the applicability of the corporate law model or the initial pre-
sumption of investor limited liability.
One could argue that an initial presumption of licensor nonliability is
unjustified given the fact that strict liability generally applies to "sellers,"
and all trademarks "help sell" the goods on which they appear. Since
modem trademark theory is based on the notion that trademarks serve ad-
190. See supra note 162.
191. See supra Part II.D.
192. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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vertising or "custom-creating" functions,193 the law should initially pre-
sume that all trademark licensors are strictly liable because all trademark
owners create and stimulate consumer demand for the trademarked
goods. 194 Again, while this may present a compelling argument, it does
not defeat my larger thesis that trademark licensors should be granted an
initial presumption of nonliability.
First, courts and legislatures have not generally accepted such an ap-
proach, presumably because they can imagine circumstances in which it
would seem inequitable to hold a noncontrolling, minimally involved,
minimally profiting licensor strictly liable. This intuition seems particu-
larly strong in the promotional licensing context where the licensor's name
or mark appears on a product next to the name of the actual manufacturer.
In these situations, the licensor's trademark undoubtedly stimulates con-
sumer demand-if it did not, the licensee would not be willing to pay
royalty fees to the licensor. But the licensee's own mark on the product
also stimulates consumer demand. In the promotional licensing context,
the licensor functions primarily as a promoter and does not appear to be a
manufacturer. Such licensors are not compelling targets for strict liability
because they rarely are in a position to ensure that the licensed goods are
free of defects.
Second, the "consumer demand" test mentioned above would be quite
broad if applied to entities other than licensors. A variety of entities "help
sell" goods and "create consumer demand" for products, yet the law does
not hold them strictly liable. Advertisers, promoters and most endorsers
195
are some of the more prominent examples. As broad as strict liability is, it
has not yet expanded to encompass every entity or person that "helped
sell" a defective product. Indeed, the class of persons potentially covered
by such a rule would be highly indeterminate. 196 For these reasons, it
probably is not prudent to extend strict liability to all trademark licensors
merely on the theory that all trademarks stimulate consumer demand for
the products on which the trademarks appear.
193. See supra Part II.A. See also MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 3:12.
194. Indeed, this appears to be the basis for the courts' broad statements in both Kasel and Con-
nelly suggesting that all trademark licensors are integral links in the enterprises that place goods into
the stream of commerce. See supra note 105 and text accompanying notes 117 and 118.
195. By contrast, several courts have imposed strict liability on entities such as Good House-
keeping that officially certify the safety of goods. See, e.g., Justin T. Beck, Hanberry v. Hearst Corp.:
Liability of Product Certifiers, 5 U.S.F. L. REV. 137 (1970).
196. In other contexts, courts have rejected tort rules that do not sufficiently define the class of
persons to which they apply. See, e.g., Ossining Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Andersen, 539 N.E.2d 91
(N.Y. 1989) (discussing problem of imposing tort duties on defendants that may expose them to li-
ability to a potentially limitless and indeterminate class of plaintiffs).
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While I have concluded that, on balance, the law should start with an
initial presumption that trademark licensors, like other investors, should be
afforded an initial presumption of limited liability, it does necessarily fol-
low that such a presumption should be strong in the licensing context as it
is in the corporate law context. Indeed, given the likelihood that classical
licensors, in particular, are likely to engage in conduct that would justify
holding them vicariously liable under several of the tests discussed below,
I would expect that the initial presumption of nonliability would be rather
weak in the classical licensing context. But even in that context, it would
nonetheless be a starting presumption, and as such, would frame the issues
and distribute the burden of proof within a fairly clear framework. Below,
I discuss the circumstances under which it may be appropriate to disregard
this initial presumption.
C. TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE SET OF "PIERCING" TESTS
I suggest that the initial presumption of licensor nonliability should be
disregarded where there are strong equitable reasons for doing so. Specifi-
cally, as a starting place, I argue that the presumption should be disre-
garded if, at the time the defective product was produced, a licensor (1)
was the "functional equivalent" of a manufacturer, as evidenced by the fact
that the licensor established or approved design or manufacturing specifi-
cations, standards, or dictated the contents of product warnings for the li-
censee's defective goods; (2) controlled the particular activity, such as
product design, that gave rise to the harm; (3) contracted with a licensee
that it knew or should have known was not adequately insured against rea-
sonably foreseeable product liability risks; (4) induced consumers to be-
lieve that the licensor manufactured the licensed goods or vouched for the
safety of those goods; or (5) contracted with a foreign licensee that is not
subject to personal jurisdiction in the state where the licensed goods were
sold to the plaintiff.
Of course, these tests are not necessarily all encompassing. There
may be other circumstances that would justify a finding that a licensor has
abused the privilege of doing business in the licensing form. But these
tests reflect many of the concerns that are latent in the enterprise liability
cases, and they contain the platform for developing a more coherent theory
of licensor liability law. 197 In the sections that follow, I discuss each of the
197. Furthermore, the proposed tests are generally consistent with the underlying purposes of
strict liability. They are sufficiently flexible to enable courts to impose strict liability on licensors
who function as manufacturers or who use licensing arrangements to improperly avoid liability for the
benefit of themselves or their licensees. They also will enable licensors and licensees to determine in
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proposed tests in turn. However, my principal focus is on the first two
tests since they involve issues of licensor control and involvement, and
thus are most relevant to my critique of the enterprise theory.
1. Control-Based Piercing Theories
In this section, I analyze the first two proposed tests together, since
each test is based on licensor control. First, I discuss the core aspects of a
manufacturer's role in an attempt to more clearly define what it means to
be the functional equivalent of a manufacturer. Then I consider whether
the control-based tests should require proof of actual control, the right to
control, or mere involvement by a licensor.
a. The "functional equivalent of a manufacturer": In some of the
enterprise liability cases, courts have indicated that heavily involved
licensors are particularly suitable candidates for strict liability because
they are the functional equivalents of manufacturers. 198 This is a sensible
approach to vicarious liability in the licensing context because as an
equitable matter, licensors who are the functional equivalent of
manufacturers should not be permitted to escape a manufacturer's liability
through the simple maneuver of entering into a trademark license.
However, to determine whether a particular licensor is the functional
equivalent of a manufacturer, it is necessary to first identify the core
elements of a manufacturer's role-at least insofar as that role concerns
product safety. Unfortunately, few courts applying the enterprise theory
have engaged in this fundamental definitional process.
A manufacturer's core functions in relation to product safety issues
include: (1) establishing product design; (2) establishing manufacturing
specifications; (3) establishing quality control standards; (4) establishing
testing protocols; (5) determining manufacturing processes; (6) determin-
ing the contents of product labels and advertising; (7) determining the
contents of the "safety warning;" and (8) setting warranty policy. 1
99
advance whether particular conduct is likely to subject a licensor to strict liability. This increased
predictability should, in turn, enable licensors to purchase strict liability insurance only when they are
likely to need it. Finally, the proposed tests are consistent with licensors' obligations under the Lan-
ham Act, because that Act arguably does not require licensors to do any of the things that would trig-
ger liability under the proposed tests.
198. See, e.g., Torres 11, 786 P.2d 939, 945 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc).
199. To be sure, manufacturers may participate in the safety assurance process in other vital
ways, but the enumerated functions represent the core aspects of a manufacturer's safety assurance
role. Indeed, a number of states by statute have limited the application of strict liability to retail sup-
pliers based on statutorily enumerated tests. One of those tests is whether the supplier furnished the
manufacturer with the design or manufacturing specifications or formulas that were used to produce
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Although courts have focused on many of these factors, they have not
identified any one factor as more important than the others. But a close
analysis of the cases reveals that in most of the cases where strict liability
was imposed, there was a finding, or at least a genuine factual dispute, that
the licensor provided its licensee with specifications or standards for
manufacturing the goods.200 Conversely, in a case where liability was al-
leged but not imposed under the enterprise theory, the licensor did not
provide its licensees with specifications for manufacturing the product.
20 1
Accordingly, it appears that courts view this particular factor as especially
significant.
This makes sense since most product defects are likely to be related to
design or manufacturing specifications, manufacturing methods, or quality
control standards. When, as is often the case, the cause of a particular
product defect is unclear, it is reasonable to apply vicarious liability to the
entity that is generally responsible for the development of the product.
The list of eight items identified above thus provides a useful initial test
for determining whether a particular licensor is the functional equivalent of
a manufacturer.
b. "Control" vs. "Involvement": Courts have not clearly indicated
whether the enterprise liability theory requires proof of a licensor's actual
control, right to control, significant involvement, or mere participation in
the licensee's operations. This is no small problem as vicarious liability
normally requires a showing of actual control. Mere involvement or
participation is rarely, if ever, grounds for such liability.
Unfortunately, courts have fudged this issue in the enterprise liability
cases. In some of these cases, courts have cited to the licensor's actual
control. In other cases, they have cited to the licensor's right to control or
refer to the right to control as if it were tantamount to actual control. At
other times, they purport to rely on evidence of "significant involvement"
or "participatory connection." This ambiguity is unnecessary.
A measure of clarity can be achieved by focusing on various types of
involvement in the context of a particular aspect of the manufacturing
process. For example, I have said that, for present purposes, the essential
elements of a manufacturer's role are establishing product specifications,
the product. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.78 (Anderson 1995) (imposing a manufacturer's
product liability on a supplier who "created or furnished a manufacturer with the design or formula-
tion that was used to produce, create, make, construct, assemble, or rebuild that product or a compo-
nent of that product").
200. See supra Part III.
201. See discussion of Burkert v. Perol Plus of Naugatuck, Inc., supra Part III.A.5.
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standards or warnings, and that these elements collectively should be the
most important factor in determining a licensor's strict liability.
A licensor's involvement in these core areas may fit into one of the
following four categories: (1) the licensor merely suggests or advises that
certain specifications be adopted, but there is no expectation that the
specification will be used, and, in fact, they are not used; (2) the licensor
knows, or reasonably can foresee, that the licensee relies on the licensor to
provide accurate and safe specifications, and the licensee does, in fact, so
rely; (3) the licensor contractually retains the right to dictate specifications
and standards but does not actually do so; and (4) the licensor retains the
right to dictate standards or specifications and does so.
The critical question is whether these distinctions should make a dif-
ference in determining whether a licensor is held strictly liable. I contend
that they should. Specifically, I propose that strict liability should attach
only when the licensor is involved in core manufacturing functions and its
involvement fits into categories two or four, and in some instances, cate-
gory three listed above. I argue that in all cases, the bottom line should be
whether there was an understanding between the licensor and licensee-
either tacit or express-that the licensor would provide specifications,
standards, or warnings for the licensed goods and that it, in fact, does so.
When this test is met, it is reasonable to say that the licensor is indeed the
functional equivalent of a manufacturer. In the sections that follow, I
consider each type of licensor involvement in turn.
i. Advice, consultation, and assistance: Mere involvement or
participation of the type described in category one is insufficient to justify
imposing strict liability on trademark licensors. First, involvement or
participation-in the form of advice, suggestions, or assistance that is not
adopted-is rarely the basis for vicarious liability. Indeed, if such
involvement were sufficient to create vicarious and strict liability, all sorts
of entities would be vicariously and strictly liable for defective products
produced by others. Independent design firms, outside consultants, in-
house employees, and even attorneys provide advice and assistance to
manufacturers. Indeed, many of these entities profit from the provision of
such advice or assistance, yet the law does not make them liable for
product defects on this basis alone. There is no sound reason why
trademark licensors, who also merely provide advice, suggestions, or
assistance that is not accepted or followed, should be treated differently.20 2
202. Indeed, we generally recognize that the provision of advice and suggestions is a positive
thing and should be encouraged. A rule of law that imposes vicarious liability on trademark licensors
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ii. Involvement that induces foreseeable reliance: Licensors, who
know their licensees are relying on them to perform core manufacturing
functions, should be subject to strict liability under the functional
equivalence test.2°3  If a licensor provides its licensee with product
specifications knowing they will be used, it would be absurd to find that
the licensor was not the functional equivalent of a manufacturer merely
because it did not dictate that the specifications be followed. Thus, the
bottom-line test should be whether there is an understanding, either
express or tacit, that the licensee will follow the licensor's specifications
and standards, and that the licensor in fact does so.
iii. The right to control: A compelling argument can be made that
it is incongruent to hold that a licensor, who has the right to control
product specifications and standards or other aspects of the manufacturing
or design process, should not be subject to strict liability, but that a retail
seller, who generally has no such right, should be subject to strict
liability. 2°4 Indeed, if a licensor has the right to control the quality of its
licensees' products, it arguably is in a position to ensure that the licensed
goods are safe, or at least that they contain sufficient warnings. One of the
fundamental purposes of strict liability is to shift the cost of insuring
against product accidents to entities that are best situated to ensure that
they do not happen in the first place.
However, premising a licensor's strict liability on the mere right to
control product quality is problematical for several reasons. First, vicari-
ous liability rarely turns on the mere "right to control" in a general
sense.20' To the contrary, courts generally require a showing that the al-
based merely on vague notions of "involvement" would likely create perverse incentives for licensors
to remain totally uninvolved in their licensee's affairs--even if their advice or assistance would
maximize operational efficiency and product safety. It does not make sense for the law to penalize or
discourage wholly beneficial involvement through the threat of strict liability.
203. Such involvement may be grounds for imposing negligence liability on licensors under sec-
tion 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. That provision imposes direct negligence liability on
entities in circumstances that closely parallel the conduct described in the second category. Under
section 324A, an actor is liable to third parties if the actor negligently provides advice or assistance to
a second party and can reasonably foresee that the second or third party is detrimentally relying on the
first party for the provision of such services. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965).
204. This position is advanced in a student note on the Connelly case:
It would be incongruous to hold a defendant, such as a retailer or a distributor, liable for an
injury caused by a defective product the quality of which was beyond his ability to control,
and to exculpate a trademark licensor who has a legal obligation to directly control the na-
ture and quality of the product during [the] manufacture.
See Mary Stanley Silverberg, Note, Products Liability: Imposing Strict Products Liability on the
Trademark Licensor- Conelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., 5 U. DAYTON L. REV. 408, 423 (1980).
205. See, e.g., Maki v. Copper Range Co., 328 N.W.2d 430 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (refusing to
apply "retained control" concept to hold stockholder vicariously liable for torts of corporation).
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leged principal controls the "method and manner" of the alleged agent's
work.z" 6 There is no valid reason to adopt a different approach in the li-
censing context.
Second, states increasingly are moving away from holding retail sell-
ers and wholesalers strictly liable. In fact, some states by statute com-
pletely exempt nonmanufacturers from strict liability.20 7 Other states have
enacted statutes providing that such sellers will be subject to strict liability
only if the manufacturer of the defective goods is unavailable or insol-
vent.208 Accordingly, the fact that retail sellers generally are subject to
strict liability, even absent a right to control product quality, should not be
dispositive.
Third, nonmanufacturing sellers are subject to strict liability under
section 402A because they are engaged in the actual physical exchange of
products in the marketplace and thereby implicitly warrant the safety of
those goods.20 9 This is not usually the case with trademark licensors. The
absence of involvement in the actual physical exchange of goods, at any
stage in the distribution process, distinguishes licensors from all other en-
tities-such as retailers, wholesalers, jobbers, and lessors-to which strict
liability normally applies. Given that one of the underlying rationales of
strict liability is the notion that those engaged in the physical transfer of
goods implicitly warrant their safety to other entities in the chain of distri-
bution and ultimately to the consumer, this distinction may explain why
206. See, e.g., Drexel v. Union Prescription Ctr., Inc., 428 F. Supp. 663, 666 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(holding that a plaintiff must demonstrate not only that the principal has the right to control the results
of its agent's work, "but also the very manner in which the work is to be done"), rev'd on other
grounds, 582 F.2d 781 (3d Cir. 1978); McLaughlin v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 321 A.2d 456, 459
(Conn. 1973) (finding that actual agency requires a showing that the licensor has "the right to direct
and control the performance of the work by the agent"); Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Smith, 183 S.E.2d 66
(Ga. Ct. App. 1971) (holding no actual agency where licensor/franchisor did not have the right to
control the "day-to-day operation" of the licensee's business). See also Oberlin v. Marlin Am. Corp.,
596 F.2d 1322, 1327 (7th Cir. 1979) (determining that the Lanham Act quality control requirement
does not "give a licensor control over day-to-day operations of a licensee beyond that necessary to
ensure uniform quality of the product or service in question" and thus "does not ... saddle the licen-
sor with the responsibilities under State law of a principal for his agent"); Smith v. Cities Serv. Oil
Co., 346 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1965); Coe v. Esau, 377 P.2d 815 (Okla. 1963); Murphy v. Holiday Inns,
Inc., 219 S.E.2d 874 (Va. 1975).
207. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-11-1 (Supp. 1996); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,181 (1995);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-9 (Michie 1995).
208. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 7001 (1989); IDAHO CODE § [6-1407] 6-1307 (1990);
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-621(a)-(c) (Vest 1993 & Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3306
(Supp. 1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.340 (Michie 1992); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PROC.
§ 5-311 (1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 544.41 (West 1988); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.762 (1988); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 99B-2 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-06.1 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-106
(Supp. 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.040 (West 1991).
209. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRoDuCrs LIABILITY § 1 cmt. a (1997).
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several courts and the authors of the Restatement (Third) of Torts have
been reluctant to impose strict liability on the "mere licensor."
Fourth, it is not at all clear what the right to control means in this
context.210 If the right to control the quality of the licensed goods is boi-
lerplate language inserted to satisfy the Lanham Act, it may mean very lit-
tle. However, if the contractual right to control goes beyond the Lanham
Act, it may be more significant. For example, contractual language of this
sort might be quite relevant if the licensor retains the right to control prod-
uct safety, to dictate specifications, and to dictate the contents of product
warnings. In these circumstances, it might be reasonable to find that the
licensor is the functional equivalent of a manufacturer based on such con-
tractual language. I suspect, however, that such language is rare.
Fifth, if the mere right to control product quality was sufficient to
justify imposing strict liability on trademark licensors, such liability would
attach to nearly all licensors, since virtually all licensing agreements grant
such rights to licensors.21' Indeed, these clauses are inserted into trade-
mark agreements even though both parties understand that the licensor has
no intention of exercising any quality control rights whatsoever. Many li-
censors will risk a finding of abandonment by not exercising such a right.
But few are so foolhardy as to not reserve such a right in the licensing
contract. Accordingly, unless courts and legislatures are prepared to apply
strict liability to all trademark licensors, the mere "right to control" cannot
be a sufficient test.212
iv. Actual control of specifications and standards: Vicarious
liability normally follows actual control. With the exceptions noted above,
there does not seem to be any reason for departing from this fundamental
principle in the trademark licensing context. Even so, the control-based
tests employed here, like those employed in the shareholder context,
should be sufficiently flexible to capture controlling investors-even in the
absence of proof of an agency relationship. Accordingly, the challenge in
the licensing context is to identify a sphere of control that captures
210. See supra Part II.D.
211. See supra Part II.D.
212. See, e.g., Maki v. Copper Range Co., 328 N.W.2d 430, 432 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)
(rejecting a "right to control" test in the corporate veil piercing context on the ground that such a right
is i in the shareholder/corporation relationship; such a test thus would render the protection of the veil
nugatory). To the extent licensors are entitled to a similar presumption of nonliability, a "right to
control" test would similarly negate that presumption. Indeed, if the right to control were enough,
there would be no such thing as a "mere licensor," as contemplated by the Arizona Supreme Court in
Torres I. To the contrary, by definition, all licensors would be "substantial participants" in their li-
censees' affairs and thus subject to strict liability.
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licensors who are the "functional equivalent of manufacturers," that does
not require the type of day-to-day control required to find an agency
relationship, and that gives appropriate weight to Lanham Act control.
213
As I show below, corporate law may again provide a useful framework for
devising a test that satisfies these criteria.
Under corporate law as it exists in some states, veil piercing is permit-
ted if a shareholder exercises control in one of two ways. First, the corpo-
rate form will be disregarded if the shareholder totally dominates and con-
trols the corporation such that, as a practical matter, the corporation has no
independent existence separate and apart from the shareholder. I call this
"generic piercing." Second, in many jurisdictions, veil piercing is permit-
ted if the shareholder controls the corporation with respect to the particular
activity, or area of activities, which gave rise to the cause of action.214 I
call this "transaction-specific" piercing.
This same general approach might be applied in the licensing context.
Under such an approach, licensors would be subject to strict liability if
they either generally control the operations of the manufacturer, or control
the particular aspect of the manufacturing operation that gave rise to the
213. "Vicarious liability" in this context means that if a licensor provides its licensees with
faulty specifications and standards for manufacturing the licensed goods, the licensor will likely be
held directly liable under section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts if the specifications
caused the product defect. By contrast, vicarious liability applies when such a causal connection can-
not be established. I propose that in the latter circumstances, courts determine a licensor's strict li-
ability based on certain principles borrowed from corporate veil piercing law.
214. In the corporate law context, a number of courts have permitted a form of veil piercing
when a shareholder "directly participates" in the transaction that gave rise to plaintiff's claim. For the
most part, these courts have not required proof of a direct causal connection between the plaintiff's
injury and the shareholder's participation. Rather, piercing has been permitted if the shareholder con-
trolled the area of corporate decisionmaking that gave rise to the harm. See, e.g., Kingston Dry Dock
Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 1929) (L. Hand, J.) (discussing the
transaction-specific theory of shareholder, control-based liability). See also Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB,
887 F.2d 739, 759 (7th Cir. 1989) (suggesting that the "direct participation" theory be limited to
situations where "the parent corporation's control over particular transactions is exercised in disregard
of the separate corporate [paraphernalia] of the subsidiary"). A similar piercing theory might be used
in the licensing context. That is, even if a plaintiff could not show that a particular licensor exten-
sively controlled all aspects of its licensees' operations, such that the licensor generally was the
"functional equivalent of a manufacturer," it might still be appropriate to impose vicarious liability on
a licensor who "controls" the particular aspect of the licensee's operation that gave rise to the product
defect. For example, under this piercing test, a plaintiff asserting a design defect claim would only
have to show that the manufacturer dictated the design specifications for the product. Similarly, in a
manufacturing defect case, plaintiff would only have to show that the licensor dictated manufacturing
specifications or standards. In this way, a "transaction-specific" piercing test would allow plaintiffs to
prevail against licensors who were in fact in a position to eliminate the unsafe character of the prod-
uct, even though their involvement did not rise to the level where they can be characterized as the
"functional equivalent" of a manufacturer.
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product defect. Under either prong of this test, plaintiffs would not be re-
quired to show a causal connection between the licensor's control and the
product defect or their injuries.
By "control," I do not mean close or even constant supervision over
day-to-day operations of the licensee. Rather, I mean only that there is an
understanding between the parties that the licensor will dictate either major
policy regarding standards or specifications for manufacturing, designing,
or selling the goods, or dictate the contents of product warnings. The pro-
posed test would capture the licensor who exercises such control at the
time the licensing arrangement is established, or the licensor who subse-
quently approves specifications, standards, or warnings that are proposed
by the licensee. In either case, the licensor would be "controlling" the li-
censee under the test proposed here.
This approach would achieve many desirable goals and avoid many of
the problems that characterize current law. First, it would ensure that vi-
carious liability follows control and not mere "involvement." As stated
above, there are sound policy reasons to refrain from penalizing licensors
who merely give beneficial advice or assistance to their licensees-
especially if there is no expectation that such advice will be followed and
if it, in fact, is not followed.215
Second, by requiring actual control of the sort proposed here, and not
merely the general "right to control," licensors will not be unduly penal-
ized merely because they retain contractual control rights to satisfy the
Lanham Act. Similarly, by allowing liability to attach only if the licen-
sor's actual control is either pervasive (generic piercing) or defect-specific
(transaction-specific piercing), courts will avoid penalizing licensors who
exercise pro forma "quality control" solely to satisfy perceived Lanham
Act requirements. Courts generally have not interpreted the Lanham Act
to require licensors to dictate product specifications, standards, or warn-
ings. Accordingly, licensors who do not exercise control beyond their
Lanham Act duties should not be held vicariously and strictly liable under
the tests proposed here.
Third, these tests should ensure that strict liability is applied to all
trademark licensors who truly are the "functional equivalent" of manufac-
turers. Where there is an understanding between a licensor and its licensee
that the former will dictate product specifications and standards, monitor
the production process, perform safety testing, or dictate the content of
warnings, the licensor truly is the functional equivalent of manufacturer, at
215. See supra Part V.C.I.b.i.
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least for product safety purposes, and should not be permitted to escape
strict liability simply by entering into a licensing arrangement.
Fourth, the proposed tests should be relatively straightforward to
administer. In other areas of the law, courts frequently determine whether
one party controls another and, if so, in what respects. Courts should have
relatively little difficulty assessing whether a licensor has dictated product
standards, specifications, or warnings such that it has become the func-
tional equivalent of a manufacturer. By contrast, the current tests, which
rely on vague concepts like "participatory connection" and "significant in-
volvement," are highly indeterminate and are more difficult for courts to
administer.
216
Fifth, the proposed tests are consistent with other forms of vicarious
liability. Vicarious liability is rarely, if ever, imposed on the basis of mere
participation or involvement. Rather, such liability normally follows con-
trol. There is no reason to take a different approach in the licensing con-
text.
Sixth, the tests proposed here are much more determinate than the
"significant involvement" or "participatory connection" tests used in the
enterprise liability cases. They should thus enable licensors and licensees
to structure their relationships and adjust their behavior so as to apportion
the risk of strict liability more predictably.
Finally, the proposed tests appear to be consistent with our basic in-
tuition that classical licensors are more appropriate candidates for strict li-
ability than collateral or promotional licensors. Classical licensors would
likely be subject to strict liability under the proposed tests because they
216. In this connection, it is worth considering how such a test would be applied where, as is
often the case, the licensor is also a stockholder in its licensee. Generally, shareholders are not liable
for the debts of the corporation in which they own stock, unless there exists a recognized basis for
piercing the corporate veil. In many states, veil piercing may not be permitted merely based on a
showing of "control." Rather, plaintiffs frequently must show that the corporate form was abused or
misused in some form or fashion, or show that corporate formalities such as separate bank accounts
and corporate records were disregarded. See FLETCHER, supra note 14, §§ 41-43. Thus, in these ju-
risdictions, if a shareholder/licensor exercises substantial control, observes all corporate formalities,
and does not abuse the corporate form by stripping corporate assets or the like, it generally will not be
subject to liability under veil piercing rules. It will, however, be subject to liability under the test pro-
posed here if the nature and extent of its control makes it the functional equivalent of a manufacturer.
The normal veil piercing tests and the test proposed here are not contradictory. Indeed, if a share-
holder is also a trademark licensor and exercises control such that it is the functional equivalent of a
manufacturer, it will forfeit the protection of the corporate veil. However, it will have done so not as a
result of corporate law principles, but rather as a result of vicarious liability principles designed espe-
cially for applying strict liability in the licensing context. The corporate veil, after all, does not im-
munize shareholders from liability based on their own actions.
19981
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typically dictate the specifications and standards for manufacturing the li-
censed goods. They do so because they developed recognition for the
trademark in the relevant market and conceived of the goods themselves,
are more knowledgeable about the product and the market than the licen-
see, and are equipped to establish and maintain such control. The classical
licensor maintains active and pervasive quality control, not primarily to
fulfill the Lanham Act, but because such an arrangement makes good
business sense for both parties. In these circumstances, it is especially ap-
propriate to expose the licensor to strict liability for its licensees' goods.
In contrast, collateral licensors would less likely be held liable under
the proposed tests. This, too, makes sense. Ordinarily, collateral licensors
know less about the licensed goods than do their licensees. The collateral
licensor generally is not capable of dictating specifications, testing for
safety, or determining the contents of product warnings. As a result, col-
lateral licensors frequently defer to the licensee's expertise in these ar-
eas-again, not because of the Lanham Act, but because such deference
makes sense in these arrangements. To be sure, the collateral licensor will
retain quality control rights and may even institute a pro forma quality
control program. But the collateral licensor is rarely the functional
equivalent of a manufacturer.
Strict liability is even less likely to attach to promotional licensors
under the proposed control-based piercing tests. Promotional licensors
typically license their marks to an established manufacturer of a product
that already bears that manufacturer's name. Promotional licensors are
rarely knowledgeable about manufacturing or designing the licensed
goods. Consequently, promotional licensors, like collateral licensors, gen-
erally would not be subject to liability under the "functional equivalence"
test articulated here.
2. Undercapitalization or Asset Stripping
If licensors are to be afforded the same initial presumption of nonli-
ability as corporate investors, then it seems appropriate to burden them
with the same duties that encumber such investors. Specifically, corporate
investors have a duty to form corporations that have enough capital to
meet reasonably foreseeable financial obligations.217 If they fail to do this,
or if they strip the company of assets after it is formed, they are subject to
217. See generally FLErCHER, supra note 14, § 44.1.
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vicarious liability under traditional veil piercing law.2 18 Although corpo-
rations exist primarily to limit investors' liability, the rationale behind this
rule proposes that investors should not be permitted to manipulate the
system so as to abuse the corporate form. Corporate investors thus have a
basic duty to form adequately capitalized corporations and to refrain from
taking excessive dividends.
219
With some variations, a similar approach could be adopted in the li-
censing context. It seems consistent with the underlying rationales of strict
liability to say that trademark licensors should not be permitted to know-
ingly license their names or marks to inadequately capitalized companies,
to systematically profit from those companies, and then to escape liability
if their licensees go bankrupt. The critical issue here, as in the shareholder
context, is whether the adequacy of capitalization should be measured at
the time of the lawsuit or sometime in advance of that date.220  It would
not be too burdensome to impose a continuing duty on trademark licensors
to ensure that their licensees have sufficient assets or insurance to cover
reasonably foreseeable product liability risks. If a potential licensee does
not have such assets or insurance, the licensor should either choose a dif-
ferent licensee or purchase its own strict liability insurance.
218. See, e.g., Nilsson v. Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1543 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that
a corporation with no assets was grossly undercapitalized); United States v. Im S. Bushey & Sons, 363
F. Supp. 110, 112 (D. Vt. 1973) (noting that all profits or surplus from subsidiary were remitted to
parent on a regular basis), aff'd, 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973); Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp., 528
S.W.2d 571, 574 (Tex. 1975) (finding subsidiary undercapitalized when it had a "deficit in retained
earnings of $118,794.00").
219. See, e.g., United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 16 (D. Minn. 1974)
(holding that veil piercing is warranted where subsidiary is "run in such a manner as to pass all its
profits to the parents"). See also Galligher v. Reconco Builders, Inc., 415 N.E.2d 560, 564 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1980) ("[i]f the capital is illusory or trifling compared with the business to be done and the risk of
loss, this is a ground for denying the separate entity privilege") (quoting HENRY W. BALLANTINE,
BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 302-03 (rev. ed. 1946)).
220. In the shareholder context, the adequacy of capitalization is judged either at the time the
corporation is formed or at the time of the alleged wrong. See, e.g., Stephens v. American Home As-
surance Co., 811 F. Supp. 937, 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("[A] corporation that commences business with
adequate capital and subsequently suffers insolvency is not undercapitalized as the term is used in a
'piercing the corporate veil' question."), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Stephens v. National
Distillers and Chem. Corp., 70 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 1995). See also Laborers Clean-Up Contract Admin.
Trust Fund v. Uriarte Clean-Up Serv., Inc., 736 F.2d 516, 524 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Adequate capitaliza-
tion means 'capital reasonably regarded as adequate to enable [the corporation] to operate its business
and pay its debts as they mature."') (alteration in the original) (citing NORMAN D. LATTIN, LATTIN ON
CORPORATIONS § 15(a), at 77 (2d ed. 1971)); Comment, Alternative Methods of Piercing the Corpo-
rate Veil in Contract and Tort Cases, 48 B.U. L. REv. 123, 139 (1968) (quoting Walkovsky v.
Carlton, 233 N.E.2d 6, 14 (1966) (Keating, J., dissenting) (finding that the test is whether the corpora-
tion, at the time of formation or of the alleged wrong, has "'capital insufficient to meet liabilities
which are certain to arise in the ordinary course of the corporation's business"')).
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3. Inducing Consumer Reliance
In the corporate context, shareholders may be held vicariously liable
for the torts of their corporations if they "hold themselves out" as guaran-
tors of the corporation's debts or lead third parties to believe that they are
dealing with the shareholders as individuals rather than as a corporation.
221
An analogous principle might be employed in the licensing context. In-
deed, several courts have imposed strict liability on trademark licensors
under the "apparent manufacturer" doctrine as set forth in section 400 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. A thorough review of those cases, and
of that doctrine, is beyond the scope of this Article. 222  However, a brief
discussion of the apparent manufacturer is provided below. Section 400 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that, "[o]ne who puts out as his
own product a chattel manufactured by another is subject to the same li-
ability as though he were a manufacturer."
2 23
The official comments to section 400 state that the doctrine applies in
two types of cases: (1) where the trademark owner appears to be the actual
manufacturer of the product, and (2) where the product appears to have
been made for the trademark owner and its reputation is an assurance to
the user of the quality of the product. 224 Despite this broad language, most
courts have taken the position that the doctrine applies only to house-
branding retail sellers and does not apply to a trademark licensor who nei-
ther distributes nor sells the trademarked goods.225 Recognizing this fact,
221. See Hillsborough Holdings Corp. v. Celotex Corp. (In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp.),
166 B.R. 461,469-70 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994).
For example, if the shareholder] entered into business relationships as an individual and not
as a corporation, especially if the shareholder ignored the formalities required by law, or
held himself out to the marketplace as an individual, no doubt the shareholder will not be
permitted to hide behind the corporate shield. The corporate veil may be pierced for no
other reason than that the shareholders are bound by their conduct and are estoppe[d] to hide
behind the corporate veil.
Id. (emphasis added).
222. I address the apparent manufacturer doctrine and consumer reliance theories generally in a
separate article. See Franklyn, supra note 4.
223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965).
224. See id. cmt. d.
225. See, e.g., Yoder v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 1215, 1222-24 (10th Cir. 1997); Torres 1, 867
F.2d 1234, 1236 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The cases which apply the apparent manufacturer doctrine demon-
strate that section 400 applies only where a retailer or distributor has held itself out to the public as the
manufacturer of a product."); Affiliated FM Ins. v. Trane, 831 F.2d 153, 155 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding
section 400 inapplicable to parent corporation licensor because defective product was "put out" by
parent's subsidiary); Nelson v. International Paint Co., 734 F.2d 1084, 1088 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding
that under Texas law, section 400 does not apply to a trademark licensor who does not manufacture or
market the defective product); In re TMJ Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 880 F. Supp. 1311, 1321-22 (D.
Minn. 1995); Harmon v. National Automotive Parts Ass'n, 720 F. Supp. 79, 81 (N.D. Miss. 1989)
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the authors of the recently released Restatement (Third) of Torts take a
similar position in their restatement of the prevailing law.
226
This position may reflect the historical origins of the doctrine,227 but
it is inconsistent with the doctrine's underlying purpose and logic. The
doctrine is premised on the simple notion that one who holds himself out
as a manufacturer should be estopped from denying that one is in fact a
manufacturer. 228  Although this rationale was first articulated as a means
of imposing a manufacturer's liability on "house-labeling" sellers, it ap-
plies with equal force to trademark licensors.229 Hence, if a plaintiff can
prove (1) that a trademark licensor, by placing its name on a product, in-
duces consumers to believe that the trademark licensor made the product
or vouches for its safety, and (2) that plaintiff purchased a defective prod-
uct in reliance on such a belief, it would seem that the licensor should be
estopped from denying that it manufactured the goods. In such circum-
stances, if the actual manufacturer would have been subject to strict liabil-
ity, the same standard of liability should be applied to the licensor.
(applying Mississippi law to find that the "comments to § 400... suggest that it does not apply to one
who is not a seller or distributor of a product").
226. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 14 cmt. d (1997).
The rule stated in this section does not, in its terms, apply to the owner of a trademark who
licenses a manufacturer to place the licensor's trademark or logo on the manufacturer's
product and distributes it as though manufactured by the licensor. In such a case, the licen-
sor does not "sell or distribute as its own a product manufactured by another." Thus, the
manufacturer may be liable [under the sections of this Restatement that apply to manufac-
turer liability], but the licensor, who does not sell or otherwise distribute products, is not li-
able under this Section of this Restatement.
Id.
227. See, e.g., Hebel v. Sherman Equip. Co., 442 N.E.2d 199, 201 (Ill. 1982) (noting that section
400 was a pre-402A means of applying a manufacturer's liability to "house branding" retail sellers).
228. Seeid.at201.
[The] primary rationale for imposing liability on the apparent manufacturer of a defective
product is that it has induced the purchasing public to believe that it is the actual manufacturer,
and to act on this belief-that is, to purchase the product in reliance on the apparent manufac-
turer's reputation and skill in making it.
Id.
229. See, e.g., Brandimarti v. Caterpiller Tractor Co., 527 A.2d 134 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). Cat-
erpiller, a licensor/parent corporation, was held strictly liable under the apparent manufacturer doc-
trine for personal injuries caused by a defective forklift manufactured by Towmotor, Caterpiller's
wholly owned subsidiary. The forklift bore the Caterpiller name and Caterpiller "could expect others
to purchase the product in reliance on the skill and reputation associated" with that name. No evi-
dence that the licensor was involved with, exerted control over, or in any way distributed or marketed
the defective product was presented. See id. See also Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., 389 N.E.2d 155,
162-63 (Il. 1979) (holding that societal purposes underlying the imposition of strict liability on one
who holds himself out as a manufacturer mandate application of the doctrine to a trademark licensor,
particularly where the product bears no indication that it was manufactured by any other entity; the
fact that the licensor was not a link in the chain of distribution was wholly irrelevant).
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To be sure, this doctrine should only apply when the licensor's name
or mark induced consumer reliance in this manner. If so limited, the doc-
trine would apply in many classical licensing situations where the licen-
sor's trademarks are the only marks on the goods. But the doctrine
probably should not apply in most collateral and promotional licensing
situations, where the identity of the actual manufacturer is disclosed on the
products and consumers purchase the goods primarily in reliance on the
reputation of the actual manufacturer.23 ° In such circumstances, plaintiffs
will be hard-pressed to prove that they purchased the trademarked goods
because they believed the licensor either made them or vouched for their
safety.
4. Contracting with Unavailable or Foreign Licensees
In this section, I discuss the significance of the fact that in many of
the enterprise liability cases, the licensee at issue was outside the personal
jurisdiction of the court or not subject to strict liability in its country of
origin.231 First, I argue that this factor should be formalized as an inde-
pendent piercing test, such that licensors waive the presumption of limited
liability if they contract with foreign licensees who are not subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction in states where the goods are sold. I then consider
whether courts or legislatures should enact "safe harbor" statutes for licen-
sors, which would exempt licensors from strict liability if the actual manu-
facturer, wholesaler, or retailer of the defective goods is solvent and is
subject to the personal jurisdiction of the forum court.
a. Unavailable or foreign licensees: It seems consistent with the
underlying purposes of strict liability to require licensors to contract with
licensees who will be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the courts in
230. But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 14 cmt. c (stating that the
doctrine should apply even when the identity of the actual manufacturer is disclosed on the goods,
because even in that situation consumers purchase the goods in part because of their reliance on the
reputation of the trademark owner). It is highly questionable whether this is an accurate restatement
of the existing case law, even in the context of the application of the apparent manufacturer doctrine
to "house branding" sellers. Indeed, the authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts took the oppo-
site position:
[W]here the real manufacturer or packer is clearly and accurately identified on the label or
other markings on the goods, and it is also clearly stated that another who is also named [i.e.,
the house branding seller] has nothing to do with the goods except to distribute or sell them,
the latter does not put out such goods as his own [and thus is not liable under this Section of
the Restatement].
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 cmt. d (1965).
231. See discussion supra Part III.
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which the licensed goods are sold.232 The penalty for failing to meet this
requirement should be a loss of the presumption of limited licensor
liability.
Indeed, in several of the enterprise liability cases, courts seemed
troubled by the fact that the manufacturer/licensees were unavailable as
defendants.2 33 Thus, if the trademark licensors in those cases were not
subject to strict liability, the plaintiffs might have been forced to litigate in
foreign countries which did not recognize the doctrine of strict liability.
This, in turn, would impede the interest of the forum state where the plain-
tiff purchased the defective goods in applying its own strict liability law to
the benefit of forum residents. In these circumstances, courts have reached
out to impose strict liability on trademark licensors.
This approach seems sensible, given that one of the main purposes of
strict liability law is to provide injured consumers with adequate compen-
sation. However, it would seem better to articulate this test as a separate
ground for imposing strict liability on trademark licensors, instead of re-
sorting to broad and indeterminate concepts like the "significant involve-
ment" test articulated in Kasel or the "participatory connection" test used
in Torres. If the test were articulated in such explicit terms, trademark li-
censors would be on notice that they should either contract with American
licensees, require their foreign licensees to waive any objections they
might have to personal jurisdiction in the United States, or purchase their
own strict liability insurance.
b. A proposed "safe harbor" rule: Conversely, it might be desirable
to enact laws stating that trademark licensors shall not be required to
defend against a strict liability claim if the manufacturer, wholesaler, or
retailer is subject to service of process and able to satisfy a likely judgment
against it. Several states have adopted similar rules for nonmanufacturing
sellers such as wholesalers and retailers.234 Generally, these statutes state
that nonmanufacturing sellers are not subject to strict liability unless the
manufacturer of the defective goods is unable to satisfy a likely judgment
or is outside the jurisdiction of the court. 235 If plaintiffs cannot establish
232. A similar rule has been applied to retail suppliers by statute. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2307.78 (Anderson 1995) (stating that a supplier is subject to compensatory damages based on
a product liability claim only if the claimant establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, inter
alia, that "the manufacturer of that product is not subject to judicial process in this state").
233. See id.
234. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
235. See sources cited supra note 208.
1998]
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
one of these requirements at the onset of the case, the nonmanufacturing
seller is entitled to dismissal from the action.
236
There are a number of compelling reasons to enact similar "safe har-
bor" statutes for licensors. First, in all cases where a manufacturer or other
entity in the chain of distribution is solvent and subject to jurisdiction,
there is no reason to make yet another entity spend legal fees to defend
against strict liability claims that are duplicative of claims against these
other entities.
Second, such a rule would not interfere with the general goal of strict
liability law that plaintiffs should be compensated for injuries that are
caused by defective goods. This is so because under the proposed rule, li-
censors would be immune from strict liability claims only if other entities
were not available to compensate the plaintiffs. Hence, the proposed rule
would minimize legal and insurance costs while at the same time ensuring
adequate compensation.
Third, the proposed rule would make this area of the law far more
predictable than it is today. By choosing well-capitalized licensees and re-
quiring them to waive any objections to personal jurisdiction throughout
the United States, licensors could better ascertain their exposure to strict
liability claims and the necessity of purchasing 402A insurance.
Finally, if reducing legal fees and insurance costs are sufficiently
strong interests to justify such a rule for wholesalers and retailers, then
these interests should also support the adoption of a similar rule for trade-
mark licensors.
Against these potential benefits, legislatures must weigh the potential
downsides to adopting such a statute. First, a statute of this type may place
an intolerable burden on plaintiffs. Given the fact that the licensed goods
may be labeled with only the licensor's name or mark, plaintiffs may have
considerable difficulty identifying the actual manufacturer-let alone
proving that the manufacturer is solvent and subject to the court's jurisdic-
tion. However, shifting the burden of proof on these issues to the licensor
would substantially lessen this risk. That is, the proposed rule could be
modified to state that a licensor will remain subject to a strict liability
claim unless it proves that the actual manufacturer is solvent and within
the court's jurisdiction.
Second, if the actual manufacturer declares bankruptcy, or otherwise
becomes unable to satisfy a likely judgment after the licensor has been
236. See sources cited supra note 208.
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dismissed, there is a risk that a meritorious plaintiff would go uncompen-
sated. However, legislatures have been willing to take this risk with re-
spect to retailers and wholesalers, given the cost-savings such an approach
might achieve. With licensors, there are even more compelling reasons to
take such a risk, given that they would only be relieved of strict liability if
the manufacturer, wholesaler and retailer were each unable to satisfy a
likely judgment or outside the jurisdiction of the court.23 7
Third, one may argue that the proposed statute would unduly "shield"
licensors from liability even when they were more responsible for the de-
fective goods than their licensees. If a licensor completely controls its li-
censee, requires it to follow the licensor's design and manufacturing
specifications, and otherwise dictates safety policies regarding the product,
it would seem unreasonable to allow it to escape strict liability merely be-
cause the manufacturer is subject to the court's jurisdiction and solvent.
Indeed, the possibility of such extensive involvement distinguishes licen-
sors from retailers or wholesalers and thus may call for a different ap-
proach in the licensing context. Nevertheless, extending the protection of
these statutes to licensors may be defensible even when the licensor has
exercised such control. Strict liability is a departure from the normal tort
rule that liability follows fault. One of the primary justifications for this
departure is that strict liability is a form of product-accident insurance and
that manufacturers are more able than consumers to shoulder the costs of
such insurance. Accordingly, if a manufacturer is capable of paying a
likely judgment and is legally obligated to do so, it arguably should not
matter that another entity exercised "control" over the manufacturer. In-
deed, a compelling argument can be made that it is not economically effi-
cient for society to require additional parties to defend against strict liabil-
ity claims if the manufacturer is capable of satisfying such claims.
238
237. Allowing plaintiffs to add licensors as defendants in such situations might solve this prob-
lem. However, depending on the status of the case, this solution may create as many problems as it
solves. For example, if the manufacturer becomes insolvent while the case is on appeal, it would be
procedurally impracticable, if allowable at all, for the plaintiff to add the licensor. Courts would then
have to deal with thorny issues such as whether the jury's findings against the manufacturer applied
collaterally to the licensor. If they did not, the plaintiff would have to start all over against the licen-
sor-hardly a situation that lends to reduced legal costs. In this scenario, the rule could not serve its
stated purposes.
238. Strict liability represents society's collective decision that the economic costs of strict li-
ability insurance-in the form of increased prices and decreased monies available for investment-are
worth the benefit of securing compensation for potential product injuries. As the costs of such insur-
ance are substantially and unnecessarily increased, the wisdom of this decision becomes doubtful. See
supra note 150.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued that the application of the enterprise li-
ability theory of strict liability to trademark licensors has been uneven at
best and entirely ad hoc at worst. I have argued that the indeterminacy of
the law in this area is neither necessary nor desirable. A more coherent
theory of licensor liability can be constructed by borrowing the basic ana-
lytical framework from corporate veil piercing law. Such a framework
would include an initial presumption of licensor nonliability, coupled with
a collection of clear, yet flexible "piercing" tests. As a starting place, I
have suggested that this initial presumption should be discarded based on
proof that a particular trademark licensor: (1) operated as the functional
equivalent of a manufacturer; (2) controlled the area of its licensee's op-
erations that gave rise to the plaintiff's injury; (3) knowingly or recklessly
contracted with a licensee who could not meet reasonably foreseeable
product liability risks; (4) "held itself out" as an entity that made or
vouched for the safety of the licensed goods; or (5) contracted with a for-
eign licensee who is not subject to personal jurisdiction in the states where
the licensed goods are sold.
The proposed tests are based on a coherent theory of vicarious liabil-
ity and are consistent with the underlying purposes of strict liability gen-
erally. They are sufficiently flexible to enable courts to impose strict li-
ability on licensors who are the functional equivalents of manufacturers, or
who use licensing arrangements in an improper attempt to escape tort li-
ability. They also offer a greater degree of certainty that minimally in-
volved licensors who contract with sufficiently capitalized and jurisdic-
tionally available licensees will not be held strictly liable nor forced to
shoulder the costs of 402A insurance. In an era when such insurance has
become increasingly expensive, this is a desirable goal, especially where
other entities in the chain of distribution already insure against the same
risks.
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